

## TECHNO-CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN INDIAN LEGAL EDUCATION: INTEGRATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INDIAN KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS

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### ABSTRACT

*Indian legal education is being reshaped by two linked pressures: the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence in legal practice and pedagogy, and the renewed demand to decolonise curricula through engagement with Indian Knowledge Systems (IKS). This article argues that these pressures should not be treated as separate reform agendas. Both concern the production, validation, and institutional control of legal knowledge. To explain their relationship, the article proposes techno-constitutional pluralism, a normative framework for legal education that aligns AI literacy, constitutional morality, epistemic diversity, academic freedom, and institutional equality. The framework is distinct from constitutional pluralism and digital constitutionalism because its primary site of analysis is the law school as an institution of legal knowledge production. Anchored in Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, and 39A of the Constitution of India, and read alongside the National Education Policy 2020, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and UNESCO's guidance on generative AI in education and research, the framework treats technological competence, constitutional discipline, and epistemic diversity as mutually reinforcing rather than competing goals. The article makes four claims. First, techno-constitutional pluralism is best understood as a framework for legal education rather than as a theory of state power or platform governance. Second, decolonisation in legal education should be understood as a critical project directed at curriculum, language, method, institutional design, and knowledge validation. Third, IKS, especially Nyaya and Mimamsa, can serve as critical resources for evaluating inference, interpretation, and explanation in AI-mediated legal pedagogy, provided they are used critically rather than symbolically. Fourth, the framework exposes structural constraints, including symbolic inclusion, institutional inequality, academic closure, faculty capacity gaps, and data dependency, that must be addressed if reform is to be meaningful.*

**Keywords:** Legal Education; Artificial Intelligence; Indian Knowledge Systems; NEP 2020; Constitutional Morality; Techno-Constitutional Pluralism; Decolonisation..

## INTRODUCTION

Indian legal education now faces a dual transformation. Artificial intelligence tools are increasingly used for legal research, drafting, translation, document review, and predictive analytics, while policy discourse increasingly calls for decolonisation through Indian Knowledge Systems and multilingual reform. These developments are often discussed separately. Yet both concern the production, validation, circulation, and institutional control of legal knowledge. UNESCO's guidance on generative AI emphasises human agency, privacy, inclusion, and linguistic diversity, while the National Education Policy 2020 foregrounds interdisciplinarity, flexibility, multilingualism, and Indian Knowledge Systems. This article argues that law schools require a framework capable of bringing these commitments into a common constitutional field. It proposes techno-constitutional pluralism as a normative framework through which technological competence, constitutional morality, and epistemic diversity can be understood as co-constitutive rather than competing goals. The framework is intended to be both pedagogical and institutional. It asks not merely how law schools should use AI, but what forms of legal reasoning, constitutional responsibility, and intellectual pluralism they ought to cultivate.

The article proceeds in seven stages. It first clarifies the meaning of decolonisation in the context of legal education. It then develops the conceptual architecture of techno-constitutional pluralism and distinguishes it from constitutional pluralism, digital constitutionalism, and AI governance frameworks. The article next identifies a gap in existing scholarship before outlining its methodological approach. It then develops the constitutional foundations of the framework and examines the relationship between AI literacy, Indian Knowledge Systems, and legal reasoning. Finally, it explores curricular implications, institutional constraints, and future directions for reform. These concerns require a closer examination of what decolonisation should mean within legal education

## RETHINKING DECOLONISATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION

In this article, decolonisation does not mean the replacement of one canon with another, nor does it imply the uncritical celebration of precolonial knowledge as inherently superior. Rather, it refers to a critical reworking of legal education across five dimensions: curriculum, language, method, institutional design, and knowledge hierarchy.

Curriculum must expand beyond inherited colonial canons and recognise a wider range of intellectual traditions. Language must be understood as a question of access, participation, and legal citizenship rather than a simple problem of translation. Method must permit engagement with multiple forms of reasoning and interpretation. Institutions must become more equally equipped to participate in knowledge production. Knowledge hierarchies must themselves become objects of constitutional scrutiny rather than unquestioned inheritances.

This definition is necessary because decolonisation is frequently invoked in a symbolic manner. In legal education it can become little more than the addition of a few traditional texts, the renaming of a course, or the repetition of civilisational narratives. A more serious account asks which forms of reasoning are authorised, which sources are treated as legitimate, and which institutional structures shape the circulation of legal knowledge.

Decolonisation in this sense seeks to cultivate legal professionals who can reason across multiple intellectual traditions without subordinating one to another. It encourages constitutional evaluation of all knowledge claims while recognising the historical conditions under which those claims emerged. The objective is not cultural substitution but epistemic self-awareness. Having defined decolonisation in critical terms, the next section develops the conceptual framework through which AI and Indian Knowledge Systems may be brought into productive relation.

## THE FRAMEWORK OF TECHNO-CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM

Techno-constitutional pluralism is a normative framework for legal education that aligns five elements: constitutional morality, AI literacy, epistemic pluralism, academic freedom, and institutional equality.

Constitutional morality provides the normative anchor. Technological innovation and curricular reform must remain consistent with equality, dignity, liberty, privacy, and access to justice.

AI literacy provides the technical and critical competence necessary to understand how systems are trained, how outputs are generated, and how algorithmic opacity may influence legal judgment.

Epistemic pluralism recognises that legal reasoning can draw upon multiple intellectual traditions, provided that each tradition remains open to critical examination and constitutional evaluation.

Academic freedom supplies the conditions under which inquiry becomes possible. Law schools cannot cultivate critical judgment if they merely transmit settled orthodoxy, whether technological or cultural.

Institutional equality addresses the material conditions of reform. Educational innovation remains incomplete if access to infrastructure, technology, faculty expertise, and research resources is confined to elite institutions.

The framework is therefore institutional, normative, and pedagogical. It identifies the conditions under which AI literacy and IKS integration can be aligned with constitutional commitments rather than reduced to technological enthusiasm or symbolic recovery. The framework gains sharper significance when placed against the literature to which it responds and the gap it seeks to address.

## SITUATING THE FRAMEWORK

Techno-constitutional pluralism differs from existing frameworks in three significant ways.

First, unlike constitutional pluralism, it is concerned less with overlapping sites of authority than with

the internal structure of legal education.

Second, unlike digital constitutionalism, it is not primarily focused on platform governance or digital regulation, but on the curricular and institutional conditions through which legal knowledge is formed.

Third, unlike generic AI governance frameworks, it places constitutional values and epistemic diversity at the centre of educational design.

These distinctions are not merely terminological. Constitutional pluralism is most useful when explaining interactions among multiple constitutional authorities or normative orders. That literature illuminates tensions among courts, legislatures, supranational institutions, and competing legal systems. However, it does not by itself explain how law schools should train students to reason across constitutional doctrine, digital systems, and diverse intellectual traditions.

Digital constitutionalism performs a different function. It seeks to translate constitutional values into digital environments by addressing issues such as surveillance, platform governance, algorithmic accountability, and data protection. This work is indispensable for understanding the regulation of digital technologies. Yet it does not fully address the educational question: how legal reasoning itself should be cultivated in a technological age.

Techno-constitutional pluralism therefore bridges two gaps: the gap between constitutional theory and educational design, and the gap between technological literacy and epistemic justice. Its focus is the law school as an institution of legal formation, where AI systems, constitutional commitments, and plural knowledge traditions intersect.

The distinction from constitutional pluralism may be further clarified through Paul Schiff Berman's theory of global legal pluralism. Berman demonstrates how legal actors increasingly operate within overlapping normative orders rather than within discrete and territorially bounded systems. While that framework is valuable for understanding interactions among competing legal authorities, techno-constitutional pluralism focuses on a different problem: the formation of legal reasoning within educational institutions. Its concern is not primarily the coexistence of legal regimes but the cultivation of lawyers capable of navigating constitutional commitments, technological systems, and plural knowledge traditions simultaneously. This distinction becomes clearer once the existing scholarship and the limits of current approaches are considered.

## **LITERATURE AND RESEARCH GAP**

Scholarship concerning artificial intelligence and legal education has expanded rapidly, yet it remains fragmented across several distinct strands. One strand focuses on AI as a pedagogical tool for legal research, drafting, assessment, and feedback. A second examines concerns relating to bias, privacy, hallucination, and technological dependency. A third explores constitutional and governance questions

involving data protection, algorithmic accountability, and platform power. A fourth addresses decolonisation and Indian Knowledge Systems through discussions of curriculum reform, epistemic recovery, and critiques of colonial inheritance.

This concern is not entirely new. Scholarship on legal education has long emphasised the relationship between legal training, democratic citizenship, and social transformation. Upendra Baxi's work on socially relevant legal education argued that legal pedagogy should remain attentive to questions of justice, access, and institutional accountability, while N.R. Madhava Menon's reforms sought to connect professional legal training with broader public purposes. Contemporary debates regarding AI in legal education extend these concerns by asking how digital systems reshape knowledge production, professional competence, and institutional authority.

Together, these strands establish the significance of the topic, but they do not adequately integrate AI, constitutional morality, and Indian Knowledge Systems within a single framework for legal education. Against this background, the article turns to its methodological orientation and the sources on which it relies.

## **METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES**

The article uses three complementary methods. First, doctrinal analysis is employed to examine constitutional principles relevant to education, technological governance, and institutional accountability. Second, policy reading is used to interpret the National Education Policy 2020, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and UNESCO guidance on generative AI in education and research. Third, conceptual reconstruction is used to evaluate whether selected traditions within Indian Knowledge Systems can function as analytical resources for contemporary legal reasoning.

The source selection is purposive. Constitutional materials are chosen for their relevance to rights, institutional accountability, and educational governance. Policy materials are selected because the article addresses regulated legal education rather than abstract educational theory. Classical traditions are chosen because they offer sophisticated accounts of inference, interpretation, justification, and textual reasoning that bear direct relevance to legal analysis.

Conceptual reconstruction is employed to translate concepts developed within classical intellectual traditions into contemporary analytical frameworks without presuming historical continuity or normative superiority. Nyaya and Mimamsa are selected because they provide particularly developed accounts of inference, interpretation, and justificatory reasoning that can illuminate contemporary questions concerning AI-mediated legal knowledge. They are used as illustrative traditions rather than exhaustive representations of Indian intellectual history.

The article is therefore conceptual rather than empirical. It does not seek to measure AI adoption rates or

evaluate classroom outcomes. Rather, it develops a normative framework grounded in constitutional doctrine, educational policy, and institutional developments. This methodological choice provides the basis for identifying the constitutional principles that sustain the framework.

## CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

Constitutional morality provides the normative foundation of techno-constitutional pluralism. Reform cannot be justified solely by efficiency, employability, technological sophistication, or cultural authenticity. Instead, educational innovation must satisfy constitutional standards relating to equality, dignity, liberty, privacy, access to justice, and democratic participation.

Article 14 requires scrutiny of algorithmic bias and unequal access to educational technologies. Article 21 requires legality, necessity, and proportionality when institutions deploy AI-enabled surveillance, remote proctoring, predictive analytics, or behavioural monitoring systems. Articles 21A and 39A require that digital transformation not deepen educational exclusion or undermine access to justice. Article 19(1)(a) supports academic freedom, intellectual inquiry, and the open exchange of ideas.

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 strengthens these constitutional concerns. AI-enabled pedagogy, learning analytics, remote examination systems, and third-party educational platforms all involve the collection and processing of student data. Questions of consent, purpose limitation, data minimisation, storage limitation, and institutional accountability therefore become central to any constitutional analysis of AI in legal education.

Data protection should not be treated merely as a compliance requirement. It forms part of the constitutional infrastructure through which technological systems affect dignity, autonomy, and informational self-determination. Law schools must therefore ensure transparency regarding the collection, use, and governance of student data.

UNESCO's guidance on generative AI reinforces this constitutional approach by emphasising human agency, privacy protection, institutional responsibility, inclusion, and linguistic diversity. The constitutional question is therefore not whether AI should be used in legal education, but under what conditions and subject to what safeguards.

Indian constitutional jurisprudence reinforces this position. In Justice *K.S. Puttaswamy* (Retd.) v. *Union of India*, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutional right grounded in dignity, autonomy, and individual self-determination. The judgment is directly relevant to AI-enabled educational systems that collect, process, and analyse student data. Likewise, *Shreya Singhal* v. *Union of India* affirmed the constitutional importance of freedom of expression in digital environments, while *Navtej Singh Johar* v. *Union of India* emphasised constitutional morality as a framework for evaluating exclusionary practices. Together, these decisions suggest that technological systems in legal education must be assessed not

only for efficiency but also for their implications for dignity, privacy, autonomy, equality, and constitutional inclusion.

Constitutional morality therefore functions as a normative limit. Neither technological enthusiasm nor decolonial aspiration can be accepted without constitutional scrutiny. Once that constitutional foundation is established, the place of academic freedom within the framework becomes easier to specify.

### **ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CURRICULAR AUTONOMY**

Academic freedom is not merely an ancillary value within techno-constitutional pluralism. It is the condition that makes critical legal education possible.

If law schools are expected to engage seriously with AI systems, Indian Knowledge Systems, and new forms of digital governance, faculty and students must retain the freedom to evaluate, challenge, reinterpret, and critique those materials without ideological coercion.

Academic freedom protects inquiry into whether technological systems genuinely improve legal reasoning or merely automate authority. It also protects inquiry into whether decolonial interventions expand intellectual horizons or create new forms of exclusion.

This issue becomes particularly important in the context of curricular reform. A regime that mandates AI adoption while discouraging criticism would undermine educational integrity. Likewise, a regime that requires the inclusion of IKS while discouraging constitutional, feminist, anti-caste, or historical critique would also weaken legal education.

Academic freedom does not imply institutional immunity from legitimate educational regulation. Rather, it requires that regulatory frameworks preserve sufficient space for critical inquiry, disciplinary autonomy, and pedagogical experimentation. Law schools must remain capable of evaluating technologies, traditions, and policies through reasoned debate rather than administrative instruction.

Techno-constitutional pluralism therefore treats academic freedom as a structural principle. It preserves the intellectual space within which constitutional commitments, technological innovation, and epistemic diversity can coexist without collapsing into orthodoxy. The value of academic freedom, however, depends on a deeper understanding of the technological systems that are reshaping legal education.

### **AI LITERACY, POWER, AND LEGAL EDUCATION**

Critical AI literacy constitutes the first substantive pillar of techno-constitutional pluralism.

AI literacy involves more than learning how to use technological tools. It requires understanding how models are trained, how outputs are generated, how datasets influence outcomes, and how algorithmic opacity affects legal judgment.

Students must also understand that AI systems are not neutral. They reflect assumptions embedded within training data, design choices, commercial incentives, and institutional priorities.

In India, one of the most significant risks is dependency. Many legal AI systems are trained primarily on English-language corpora and legal materials originating outside India. Such systems may marginalise regional-language jurisprudence, underrepresent local legal contexts, and reinforce institutional inequalities between elite and under-resourced institutions.

A constitutional response must therefore address not only technical performance but also fairness, accessibility, accountability, transparency, and data governance.

Critical AI literacy should enable students to ask questions such as: What sources informed a model's output? What forms of bias may be present? What information is omitted? How transparent is the reasoning process? Who controls the underlying infrastructure? What data are being collected from users?

The objective is not technological scepticism for its own sake. Rather, it is to cultivate lawyers capable of evaluating digital systems as constitutional actors and institutional technologies rather than treating them as neutral instruments. A critical account of AI literacy in turn opens the question of how Indian Knowledge Systems might inform legal reasoning without being reduced to symbolic inclusion.

## **INDIAN KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND LEGAL REASONING**

Indian Knowledge Systems should be introduced into legal education as rigorous intellectual resources rather than ceremonial additions to the curriculum.

Among the traditions most relevant to legal reasoning are Nyaya and Mimamsa.

Nyaya offers a sophisticated account of valid knowledge, inference, justification, and error. Its concern with evidence, reasoning, and demonstrable inference makes it particularly useful for evaluating legal argument and AI-generated explanations.

Mimamsa provides advanced theories of textual interpretation, including attention to context, coherence, hierarchy, specificity, and the relationship between general and particular provisions. These concerns remain highly relevant to statutory interpretation and legal reasoning.

At the same time, Indian Knowledge Systems should not be treated as a single homogeneous category. Nyaya, Mimamsa, Buddhist logic, Jain epistemology, and other traditions differ significantly in their assumptions, methods, and normative commitments. Any curricular integration must therefore avoid reducing intellectual diversity to a single civilisational narrative.

Constitutional scrutiny remains essential. Traditions may contain insights that are analytically valuable while also containing exclusions or hierarchies that are constitutionally unacceptable. Critical engagement requires recognising both dimensions.

The usefulness of these traditions becomes particularly apparent when evaluating AI-mediated legal knowledge. A black-box legal prediction system that cannot explain its inferential pathway would sit uneasily with a Nyaya concern for demonstrable reasoning. Similarly, a machine-generated statutory summary that ignores context, coherence, and interpretive hierarchy would appear weak from a Mimamsa perspective.

The purpose is not to romanticise tradition or reject technology. Rather, it is to use classical traditions as analytical lenses through which contemporary technological systems may be evaluated.

Techno-constitutional pluralism therefore treats Indian Knowledge Systems not as symbolic markers of cultural identity, but as intellectual resources capable of contributing to contemporary legal education when subjected to constitutional and critical scrutiny. That question leads directly to the more precise issue of what, exactly, decolonisation must accomplish in curricular and institutional terms.

## **DIMENSIONS OF DECOLONISATION**

Building on the earlier definition, decolonisation in legal education refers to the re-examination and restructuring of inherited epistemic hierarchies across five interconnected dimensions.

First, curriculum. The legal canon should not be limited to colonial and metropolitan sources. Expanding the curriculum does not require abandoning comparative or Western scholarship; rather, it requires recognising that legal knowledge has historically emerged from multiple intellectual traditions.

Second, language. English should not be treated as the sole legitimate language of legal reasoning. Linguistic diversity is not merely a pedagogical concern but a constitutional issue connected to participation, access, and legal citizenship.

Third, method. Legal reasoning should not be confined to a single inherited style of doctrinal analysis. Comparative engagement with multiple traditions can expand the analytical tools available to students without compromising legal rigour.

Fourth, institutions. Access to databases, technological infrastructure, faculty expertise, and research opportunities should not remain concentrated within elite institutions. Decolonisation requires attention to the material conditions through which legal knowledge is produced and circulated.

Fifth, validation. Knowledge should not be dismissed because it originates outside dominant intellectual traditions, nor should it be accepted uncritically because it is culturally familiar. All knowledge claims must remain open to constitutional and scholarly evaluation.

Understood in this way, decolonisation is not a rejection of constitutionalism, modernity, or legal method. It is an attempt to make legal education more self-aware about its exclusions, assumptions, and institutional structures. These dimensions of decolonisation can then be translated into concrete implications for curriculum design and pedagogical practice.

## CURRICULAR DESIGN AND PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE

Techno-constitutional pluralism has direct implications for curriculum design.

AI literacy should be embedded across legal education rather than confined to specialist electives. Students should learn to evaluate outputs, identify bias, assess dataset limitations, understand privacy implications, and analyse governance structures.

Similarly, constitutional morality should be treated as a transversal principle rather than as a topic restricted to constitutional law courses. Students studying criminal law, professional ethics, legal research, administrative law, and clinical education should be encouraged to evaluate technological systems through constitutional standards of proportionality, transparency, accountability, and fairness.

Indian Knowledge Systems should also be integrated through critical engagement rather than symbolic inclusion. Nyaya and Mimamsa can be taught alongside jurisprudence, statutory interpretation, legal reasoning, and constitutional theory. Their value lies not in replacing contemporary legal methods but in expanding the range of analytical perspectives available to students.

A particularly useful pedagogical model would be an interdisciplinary seminar on algorithmic justice and epistemic pluralism. Students could compare an AI-generated legal analysis, a conventional doctrinal analysis, and an interpretation informed by Nyaya or Mimamsa. Such exercises would teach students to interrogate technological outputs while recognising both the possibilities and limits of alternative intellectual traditions.

The objective is not curricular accumulation but curricular integration. AI literacy, constitutional values, and epistemic diversity should reinforce one another rather than appear as disconnected topics. These dimensions of decolonisation can then be translated into concrete implications for curriculum design and pedagogical practice. A brief case study helps illustrate how these claims operate in practice, particularly in relation to language, access, and legal aid.

## CASE STUDY: AI AND MULTILINGUAL LEGAL AID

AI-assisted translation provides a useful illustration of techno-constitutional pluralism in practice.

Consider three scenarios. First, a legal aid clinic uses AI to translate a client's complaint from a regional language into English. Second, a court administration system employs machine translation to generate notices and procedural information in multiple languages. Third, a law school clinic uses AI tools to create multilingual educational materials relating to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or other legal resources.

In each case, AI offers significant benefits. Translation can improve access, reduce cost, accelerate communication, and broaden participation. Individuals who do not read English may gain more

immediate access to legal information. Educational institutions may produce multilingual materials more efficiently than would otherwise be possible.

Yet translation is not a purely technical activity. Legal language contains context, hierarchy, procedural significance, and doctrinal nuance. A translation may be linguistically accurate while remaining legally misleading. A procedural instruction may appear understandable while omitting information that affects rights or obligations.

Under techno-constitutional pluralism, the central question is therefore not whether AI-assisted translation is useful but whether it is accurate, accountable, transparent, and constitutionally adequate.

A law school clinic could compare:

An AI-generated translation.

A human translation.

A contextual reading informed by Mimamsa principles of interpretation.

Students could then identify where literal translation diverges from legal meaning and where human review remains essential.

This exercise demonstrates a broader point. Technological systems affect constitutional commitments to equality, access, and justice. Their evaluation therefore requires technical competence, legal reasoning, and epistemic awareness simultaneously.

The example also illustrates why legal education matters. Future lawyers and judges are unlikely to encounter AI only in theoretical debates. They will encounter it in legal aid, court administration, legal drafting, translation, and professional practice. Their training must prepare them for those realities. The example also makes visible the structural constraints that may limit the reach of reform, even where its rationale is compelling.

## STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

Techno-constitutional pluralism faces several significant constraints.

The first is symbolic inclusion. Indian Knowledge Systems may become token additions to the curriculum if institutions fail to invest in serious scholarship, faculty development, and pedagogical design.

The second is institutional inequality. Digital infrastructure remains unevenly distributed across Indian legal education. Elite institutions often possess access to databases, software, research funding, and technological support unavailable elsewhere. Without public investment and shared infrastructure, AI adoption may deepen existing inequalities.

The third is data dependency. Many AI systems are controlled by private actors operating through proprietary models and opaque data practices. Educational institutions may become dependent on

technologies they neither fully understand nor effectively regulate.

A fourth constraint is faculty capacity. Most law teachers have not received formal training in AI systems, Nyaya, Mimamsa, or interdisciplinary pedagogy. Even well-designed reforms may fail if faculty members lack the institutional support necessary to implement them effectively.

Meaningful reform therefore requires investment in faculty development, interdisciplinary collaboration, research support, and institutional infrastructure. Workshops, collaborative teaching initiatives, research grants, and open-access educational resources can help build these capacities.

These constraints are not peripheral concerns. They determine whether techno-constitutional pluralism remains a theoretical aspiration or becomes an institutional reality. Those constraints, in turn, sharpen the significance of the objections that any serious framework must confront.

## **ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS**

A serious framework must address potential objections.

The first objection is that integrating Indian Knowledge Systems into legal education risks cultural majoritarianism. This concern is legitimate. However, it is not an argument against engagement with IKS as such. Rather, it is an argument for critical, plural, and constitutionally grounded engagement. IKS should be taught as a diverse and contested intellectual field rather than as a singular civilisational narrative.

The second objection is that AI literacy should remain technical rather than constitutional. This view underestimates the extent to which technological systems shape rights, opportunities, institutional power, and access to justice. In legal education, technical competence without normative evaluation is incomplete.

The third objection is that constitutional morality is itself contested and therefore cannot provide a stable foundation. While constitutional morality remains subject to interpretation, Indian constitutional jurisprudence has repeatedly employed it as a framework for evaluating claims relating to dignity, equality, liberty, and inclusion. The framework therefore uses constitutional morality as a normative orientation rather than as a source of uncontested answers.

The fourth objection is that Nyaya and Mimamsa contribute little to the evaluation of contemporary AI systems. Their relevance should not be overstated. They are not substitutes for computer science, data science, or technical expertise. Their value lies in sharpening attention to inference, explanation, interpretation, and justification—precisely the areas where many AI systems remain opaque.

A fifth objection is that legal curricula are already overcrowded and cannot realistically accommodate additional AI and IKS content. This concern deserves serious consideration. However, techno-constitutional pluralism does not require the creation of separate curricular silos. Many of its objectives

can be integrated into existing courses through comparative modules, clinical exercises, interdisciplinary seminars, and problem-based learning. The challenge is therefore not merely curricular expansion but curricular redesign. With those objections addressed, the article concludes by restating the normative and institutional implications of the framework.

## CONCLUSION

Indian legal education stands at a moment of profound transition. The growing use of artificial intelligence in legal work and pedagogy, alongside the renewed imperative to decolonize curricula through Indian Knowledge Systems, has created a conjuncture that demands more than incremental reform. This article has argued that these developments should be read together, since both concern the production, validation, and institutional control of legal knowledge.

To bring these pressures within a common normative field, the article has proposed techno-constitutional pluralism. Grounded in constitutional morality and read through Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, and 39A of the Constitution of India, together with the National Education Policy 2020, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and UNESCO's guidance on generative AI in education and research, the framework seeks to align AI literacy, epistemic diversity, academic freedom, and institutional equality. Its central premise is that technological competence, constitutional discipline, and plural intellectual traditions are not competing commitments, but mutually constitutive ones.

The article has also clarified that decolonization in legal education must be understood as a critical and institutional project rather than a symbolic gesture. It requires rethinking curriculum, language, method, institutional design, and the criteria by which knowledge is recognized as legitimate. Within that project, Indian Knowledge Systems such as Nyaya and Mimamsa can serve as valuable analytical resources for legal reasoning, interpretation, and explanation, so long as they are engaged critically and not reduced to cultural ornament.

Yet the possibility of meaningful reform remains constrained by structural realities. Symbolic inclusion, institutional inequality, faculty capacity gaps, and data dependency all risk hollowing out reform before it can take root. If techno-constitutional pluralism is to become an institutional practice rather than a theoretical aspiration, law schools must invest in faculty development, shared infrastructure, interdisciplinary collaboration, and transparent educational governance.

The enduring significance of this framework lies in its insistence that the future of Indian legal education

cannot be secured by technological adoption alone, nor by civilizational recovery alone. It depends instead on whether institutions can cultivate lawyers and scholars capable of reasoning constitutionally, engaging artificial intelligence critically, and moving across plural intellectual traditions without surrendering to orthodoxy. Techno-constitutional pluralism names that task, and offers a standard by which to judge whether Indian legal education is prepared to meet it.

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