

COMMUNAL POLARIZATION DURING FORTIES

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Abstract

With the dawn of 1940's Gandhi was gripped by strange type of situation in which all his ideals, principles and his wishes were literally on a stake. He wanted to wage war against Britishers whole hoggerly by securing Indian unity. Gandhi was ahead of his time and was wrongly perceived by contemporary people. But undercurrent of Indian politics were moving in opposite direction and gradually one by one, his principles were challenged, his believes were questioned and his strategies were counteracted. From all sides he was facing opposition and was completely helpless and found himself in utter failure. This paper will attempt to study and analyse the role of communal forces and gandhian approach towards the dilemma to fight at the same time, single handedly on various many fronts.

Keywords: Communal, Religion, Hindu, Muslim, Gandhi, Britishers, Forties

INTRODUCTION

Gandhi's inner voice which directs him was silent, darkness was heading towards him and he was drifting towards more saintly image of mahatma hood. He launched freedom struggle and galvanized millions of peoples of all classes, ideologies, sects and religions into his political action. His strategy was completely based on his ideals i.e. non-violence, peaceful, coexistence, satyagraha, hindu-Muslim unity and equality. Gandhi had a two fold tasks; Structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation and securing independence from the British rulers for this emerging nation. While, he was succeeded in building up nationalist consciousness among masses but he was unable to channelise their energies and them actions in single direction unitedly.

METHODOLOGY- The study was conducted based on the method of document review in accordance with the qualitative approach to research. Qualitative research is a realistic and integrated research process, which comprises qualitative data collection methods such as document analysis, observation, and interviews, and which aims to depict the existing facts without generalization

The growth of left wing parties and ideas led to a growing militancy within the nationalist ranks. SubhasChandra Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President of the Congress in 1938. In 1939 he decided to stand again this time as the spokesperson of militant politics and

radical groups. Putting forward his candidature on 21 Jan 1939, Bose said that he represented the 'new ideas, ideologies, problems and programming, that had emerged with the progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India. Gandhi gave his blessing as a candidate for the post to PattabhiSitaramaya's as a candidate for the post. Subhash was elected on 29 Jan by 1580 votes against 1377. Gandhiji declared that " Sitaramaya's defeat was more mine than his." Election brought the brewing crisis to a head at the Tripuri session of the congress. There were two major reasons for the crisis. One was the line of propaganda adopted by Bose against Gandhiji leadership, whom he branded as rightists. He openly accused him of working for a compromise with the government on the question of federation of having even drawn up a list of prospective central ministries and therefore of not wanting a leftist as the president of the congress who may be a thorn in the way of a compromise and may put obstacles in the path of negotiation. In the second part of his autobiography put forward his thinking of the period even more crudely. "As congress President, the writer did his best to stiffen the opposition of the congress party to any compromise with Britain and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then looking forward to an understanding with the British Government. The basic difference of policy and tactics were involved in the underlying Bose Gandhi debate. They were partially based on differing perceptions of the political reality and differing assessments of the strength and weakness of the congress and preparedness of the masses for struggle. Differing styles regarding how to build up a mass movement were also involved. Subhash Bose believed that the congress was strong enough to launch an immediate struggle and that the masses were ready for such struggle. He was convinced, as he wrote later, 'that the country was more ripe for a revolution than ever before and that the coming internally international crisis would give India an opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which is rare in human history. He therefore argued in this presidential address at Tripuri for a program of immediate giving the British Government six months multination to grant the national demand for independence and of launching as mass civil disobedience movement if it failed to do so?

Gandhiji's perception were very different. He, too, believed that another round for mass struggle was necessary to win freedom, for Indians facing 'an impossible situation.' Already in middle of July 1938, Gandhi had written: 'the darkness that seems to have enveloped me will disappear, and that, whether with another battle more brilliant **them the** Dandi March or without, India will come to her own'¹ But he believed, the time was not yet ripe for an ultimatum because

neither the congress nor the masses were yet ready for struggle. Indians should first 'put our own house in order. Making his position clear in an interview on 5 May 1939, Gandhiji declared: He (Subhash Bose) holds a **bight**. I am totally opposed to his wares. Today we possess no resources for a fightThere is no limit peasants to communal life We do not have the same hold among the of Bihar as we used to If today I am asked to start the Dandi March." I have not the courage to do so. How can we do anything without the workers and peasants. The country belongs only to them. I am not equipped to issue ultimatum to **the** government. The country would only be exposed to ridicule. The internal strife reached its climax at the Tripuri session of the congress held from 8th to 12th March, 1939. The resolution was passed by a big majority, but Gandhiji did not approve of the resolution and refused to impose a working committee on Subhas. He asked him to nominate a committee of his own choice Subhash refused to take up the challenge. He had placed himself in an impossible situation. He knew that he could not lead the origination of his own, but he was also not willing to accept the leadership of the majority, Bose could see no other way out, but to resign from the presidency.

Subsequently in May Subhas Bose and his followers formed the Forward Block as a new party within the Congress. The left characterized the second world war crisis provided the opportunity to achieve freedom through an all-out struggle against British imperialism. It was convinced that the masses were fully ready for action and were only waiting for a call from the leadership. They accepted that hurdles like that communal problem and weaknesses in the congress organization existed, but they were convinced that these would be easily and automatically swept away once a mass struggle was begun. Organizational strength, they said was not to be built up prior to a struggle but in the course of this struggle. Making a sharp critique of Gandhi's policy of wait and see the left accused the leadership of being afraid of the masses of having lost the zest for struggle and consequently of trying to bargain and compromise with imperialism for securing petty concessions. They urged Gandhiji to adopt immediate measures to launch a mass struggle while agreeing on the need for an immediate struggle, the left was internally divided both in its understanding of political forces and the course of political action in case **the** Gandhi did not accept the line of immediate struggle Subhash Bose wanted **the left** to split the Congress if it did not launch struggle, to organize a parallel congress and to start a struggle on its own. Gandhiji wanted to kindle mass awakening in India non-violence but in due course mass awakening in India came with the deeds of violence committed by the following two categories of freedom fighters:

The terrorist inspired by Tilak, Savarkar and Aurobindo, Anuselan, Samiti (Bengal), Karve group at Nasike, PrafullaChaki, Khudiram Bose, Jatindas, LalaLajpatRai, Ajit Singh, Bhai Pramanand, LalaHardyal, Rash Bihari Bose and his part, GopinathSaha, Ram Prasad, Bhagat Singh and his colleagues, Raja MahendraPratap, Chandrashekhar Azad and several other who were punished in Alipur conspiracy case, Delhi conferencing Case, Kolhapur Bomb Case, Tinnevelly conspiracy case, Kakori consulting case, Lahore conspiracy, Chittagong armoury laid and several other cases. Thousands of people belonging to the younger generation who took part in the various crusades launched by Gandhi who were not quite Gandhian. These boys were lacking in the wisdom, imparted by Mahatma to the chosen few at the Sabarmati Ashram. They committed heinous deeds of violence with Gandhi name on their lips. Gandhi had to order ceasefires again and again offer apology for the "madness which seized this class of followers during every sataygraha launched by him from 1919 to 1942. Gandhi however cannot be given credit for the mass awakening caused by the misconduct of these boys which differed only in degrees from those belonging to category (c). The activities of those in the category (c) like Dhingra and Bhagat Singh were well planned in advance and aimed to kill top British officers in order to create tension among them so that each one of them would feel unsafe in India and ultimately induce Britain to leave India. Unlike Gandhi's immature Satyagrahis, DhingraBhagat Singh and Savarkar, did not indulge in indiscriminating burning of railway station, police station, post offices and banks. The railway officers, the police Constables and the bank managers had not the power to grant freedom to property India. Gandhi brigade indulged in senseless destruction of national in a spontaneous unplanned, manner and only transmitted a disastrous mentality to the future generation. It cannot how ever be denied that they helped to create an emotion against the British but it was always against the best wishes and commands of their master. Thus activities of these radical revolutionaries were in reaction of unrewarded policies and struggles of Gandhi which bore no fruits and showed no signs of success. Gandhi's fruitless endeavour, saintly image and slow and divine virtues triggered their, violent spirit. 'Again his non-violent' principle was challenged by his people who were fed up of his righteous divine theory when on one side Gandhi ji was preaching peaceful co-existence equality, his these principles was facing staunch opposition of Ambedkar, who was vivaciously championed the cause of untouchables. Gandhi offered an immediate consolance to Ambedkar" I can understand the anger of a high souled and highly educated person like Dr. Ambedkar over the atrocities as were committed in Kavitha and other villages. But religion is not a house or a cloak which can be changed at will.

Change of faith by him and those who passed the resolution will not serve the cause which they have at heart, for unsophisticated illiterate Harijans will not listen to him and then especially when it is remembered that their lives for good or for evil are intertwined with those of caste Hindus."

On other hand princely states also acting contrary to Gandhi's policies and planning's. He (Nehru) is right also in his reflections on the Hindu Muslim question. It is a terrible problem and a great responsibility rests upon the congress now – therefore the greatest on you"

Now, thought constantly urged by Bengali, Muslim, including premier. Suhrawardy, FazlulHaqant others, to go to Bihar Gandhi felt he was in the right place and indeed able from Noakhali to influence Bihar.

If his four months in Noakhali seemed the peak, so for of Gandhi's lifelong effort to knit Indian's together by saving them they also saw a profound journey into his own soul, and included a daring test. He wrote on 2nd Jan in his diary. "Have been awake since 2 am, Gods grace alone is sustaining me. I can see there is some grave defects in me somewhere **which** is the cause of all this. All around me is utter darkness. When God takes me out of this all darkness into this light". On 6 Jan, he wrote to Patel.

I am in complete darkness but my hopes burns as bright as even, The same day in another letter **he** said: "The task here is a difficult **one**. I have **to** made my way through darkness But "one step enough for me" On 9 January he told an interviewer in Fetehpur that he himself was in darkness and adeed, 'I hope I shall see light soon.'" The next day, in a letter to his son Ramdas he wrote. 'I am still surrounded by darkness. I have no doubt whatever that is indicates a flaw somewhere in my method. Take it as though I had confined myself to this place to detect the flaw

What Gandhi was saying or admitting was that he did not clearly see the lead he should give to prevent division and fresh violence in India. He was at a loss, or in the dark. Short term answer for the dilemma in which **the** congress found itself in December was hardly enough. India's was hurtling towards partition and new rounds of killing and he did not quite know the remedying to prescribe. He had been in difficult situation before but in the end light had always dawned, and he had know the 'one step' to recommend to the congress and to his people, ever if what by beyond that step, was often unclear confidence about finding response had led him, in 1931 to more a large claim before prime minister Mac Donald and others at the London RTC.

"We have problems that would baffle any statesmen. We have problems that other nations have not to tackle. But they do not baffle me. This time, he felt light was being greatly delayed, if not denied. Why? And in any case, why it violence and ill will around him? Though nagged by

such questions, Gandhi plodded away at the tasks of each day.'

The league responded to Atlee announcement by launching movements to remove the Panjab and NWFP ministries as well as the congress ministry in Assam, a province that Jinnah continued to claim for Pakistan, its non-Muslim majority with standing. In Bengal a response of an opposite kind was led by the HindnuMahasabha's Shyam Prasad Mookherji, who demanded repeated west Bengal, Hindu majority region that could stay **out** of any Pakistan on 28 Feb Gandhi was asked in Haimchar" whether Bengal's partition was not desirable. His answer offered in a post prayer speech, was thank he preferred a united India and a united Bengal, yet India's Hindu majority did not have the right to 'keep everyone united by means of compulsion, and Bengal's Muslim majority could not seek to compel the provinces Hindu population or its western half. He was as much against forced partition as against forced unity." Part of the darkness in his mind had lifted: "non-coercion" was a principle he would go by. His four months in Noakhali had confirmed his faith in a people's right to choose their rulers and if it came to that, their flag, *The British flag*, in **any** case, was on its way out.

Moreover, the interim government at the centre was a house at war, with Liaquat Ali Khan and his league colleagues refusing to accept Nehru as **their** chief. As finance minister, Liaquat had announced taxes aimed at the congress's lackers.

On 9 March Gandhi saw the working committee resolution in newspapers in Bihar, where he had around four day earlier. He had not been informed of any plan to ask for a division of **the** Punjab. Kriplani, the congress president, had ended sent Gandhi a telegram on 3 March; "We all consider your presence here next working committee meeting sixth essential. Kindly postponed Bihar programme till month. To this Gandhi, who was in Calcutta by now, on his way to Bihar, ensured the same day: Your wire. Regret inability. Send message Bihar. Babu.....

But no emissary was sent to brief Gandhi on obtain his views. **The** working committees momentous decision on partitioning the Punjab and Bengal was thus taken without his knowledge or input. We realized of course, that events had forced his colleagues" dicisions, and it was not until 20 March that he wrote to Jawaharlal about it. The letter also refered to the censorship imposed **on** reports from the Punjab.

I *would* like you. to tell me what you can about the Punjab tragedy. I know nothing about it save what is allowed to appear in the press. ... Nor am I in sympathy with what may be termed by the old expression of "hush push policy". It is amazing how the country is adopting about the very measures which it criticized during the British administration.

Involving his non coercion criterion Gandhi added in this letter **that** he was against any partition

based on "Compulsion" or on the two nation theory" while he could think of a willing consent to partitioning a province following an appeal to reasons and heart the working committee resolution seemed a submission to violence on 11 March he had said:

Jinnah Sahib is my friend. I have gone to his house many time of Jinnah Sahib says to me : Concede Pakistan or I will kill you, I will reply: "you may kill me if you like, but if you want Pakistan, you should first explain it to me. If you convince me that Pakistan is a worthy ideal and Hindus **are** maligning it for no reason. I shall proclaim to **the** Hindus from **the** house tops that you should get Pakistan" Non coercion was **the** presumption also of his friend Ghaffar Khan, who **had** joined Gandhi in Bihar on 16 March, the frontier leader said:

The Muslim league wants Pakistan They can have it only though love and willing consent. Pakistan established thought force will prove a doubtful boon.

Patel was hinting that a Gandhi camping a Bihar or Noakhali could not understand the realities that he and Nehru were grappling with in Delhi and the Punjab. Having removed himself to the periphery, could Gandhi really appreciate what they faced in Delhi? Many places along with Bihar will burning in flames of communal riots. Some in Bihar justified the November violence as a means of saving Hindu across India, including in Bihar, from attracts of the Noakhali kind. A pamphlet issued by **the** provincial Hindu *Mahasabha* claimed that Bihar Muslims and flamed surprise attracts on the *Hindus* but the latter, had wisely taken by the forelock, pre emptying the supposed plan's Told by Prasad that many Biharis thought they had done well Gandhi replied that it was to save them from that sin that he had come. He knew that the real impact of the Bihar violence had been to *sway* Muslims across the subcontinent in favour of Pakistan report (Dec, 1946) by the Bihar Muslim League ahdalleyed "Gevocide" and spoken of the "Fascism" of the "Hindu Congress" and from Nov. 1946 on words pictures of the Bihar killings were displayed in the Punjab and the NWFP as the proof that Muslim would he unsafe in Hindu-majority India Gandhi spoke to officials congress committees and the public. To congress **workers** in Bir he said (19 March).

Is it or isn't it a fact that quite a large number **of** congressmen took part in the disturbances.... How many of the 132 members of your committee were involved? I have also worked in the congress. Today I am not even a four anna member. But there was a time when I was. all in all. **Hence**. I know the congress inside out....

I wish to ask you, how could you live to see on old women of 110 years. Butchered before you eyes? I will not rest not let others rest. I will wonder all over on foot and ask Skeletons (What) happened. There is such a fire raging in me that I (will) know no peace till I have found. Solution

for all *this*..... If I find that my comrades are deceiving me, I will be furious and I shall walk barefoot on and on thought hail or storm. I would throw away the soft seat and other amenities which you have offered me.

There was, he said on 5 March, a way out for Bihar :

The Hindus of Bihar have committed a grave *sin*. *They will* raise the head of Bihar Much laughter *if they* do honest reparations, greater in magnitude than their crimes. There is an English saying: The greater the sin, the greater the saint .The Punjab was waiting to explode again Bihar too was viciously polarized as was March of India. So was the interim government in Delhi to of the human family. Therefore, those who want to divide India are enemies alike of India and Islam They may cut me subscribe to something which I consider to be wrong.

The most popular and strongest argument against of Jinnah was violence. The wind was blowing in his favour. The communal riots *proved* the reality of the theory of two nations two different cultures opposite to each other jnways of life traditions and customs. This was a cultural conflict between the two hostile and antagonistic communities.

Gandhi out of helplessness, become introvert and relied on supernatural power to hold the unity of India. **He** said judgment will overtake Pakistan and Pakistan will topple under the weight of its own inequity. A satyagrahi conquers the whole world by his love.

For Jinnah the matter of Pakistan was a question of 'now or never' On July 27, 1946, the Muslim league council withdraw its acceptance of cabinet Mission plan, decided to boycott the constituent Assembly and announced a programme of direct action to achieve Pakistan. Jinnah declared that Muslims had bid good bye to constitutional methods. "We have forged a pistol he said and are in a position to use it." Jinnah who was approached by Nehru but refused to cooperate, was bitterly critical of what he described as the "caste Hindu Fascist Congress and their henchman" who sought "to dominate and rule over the Mussalmans and other minority communities of India with aid of British Bayonets". This bitterness boarded ill at a time when exemplary restraint was necessary to pull the country a critical period. The chain reaction of violent explosion which in the succeeding twelve month shook the country. To Gandhi violence in all over the country was a shocking and even a bewildering phenomenon. All his life he had worked for the day when India would set an example of non-violence to the world. The chasm between what he had cherished in his heart and what he saw was so great that he could not help feeling deep sense of failure. His first impulse was to blame himself was his technique faulty?

Had he been unobservant, careless, indifferent, impatient? Had he failed to detect in time that while to detect in time that reframed from overt violence in the struggle against foreign rule, they had continued to harbor ill feeling against the British? Was communal violence only an expression of the violence which had smouldered in the breasts of those who had paid life service to non-violence.

I was only national that he should have sought **an** explanation of this tragedy in terms of his own philosophy and of his part **in** India's political struggle. In retrospect, it would appear that he was exaggerating his own responsibility and the failure of non-violence. The **real** explanation for the violence of 1947-47 is to be sought in the tensions which the movement for Pakistan aroused both in its protagonists and antagonists. The basic premise of this movement was that Hindus and Muslims had nothing in common in the past present or future. Large sections of the populations were seized with vague hopes or equally vague fears. No one could say with certainty whether India would remain united or be divided into two **or** more states. Whether the Punjab or Bengal would react their boundaries or be split whether Indian states would be integrated into an independent India or become autonomous. The advisers of Central India and the Nagas of Assam found champions for an independence which they had never claimed before, there was a talk of a Dravidian in the south and a thousand mile corridor to link the two wings of future Pakistan. The Balkanisation of India once an ominous phrase, had become a real danger. All this excited population fantasy; the turbulent elements in the society saw in the coming transfer of power a period of vacuum.¹² Gandhi was acknowledging defeat though he was far from abdicating his principles. But to Mountbatten this was a green signal to proceed without Gandhi thought the Viceroy remained apprehensive of him till **the** last. As for Gandhi, **the** suffering humanity in **the** fair congress of his country required his presence more urgently **the** capital of a dying empire **where** politician **had** reached an oppressive level. He decided to leave Delhi with the following words to the viceroy: "I would still **love to take** the place that the late CF Andrews took. He represented no one but himself. And if you ever need my service on its merits, it will be always at your disposal.

Before *it* Nehru Patel and **the** working committee had approved **the** Mountbatten plan, this approval became official when the all **India** congress committee sitting in New Delhi, voted

153 for the plan, 29 August with some abstention.

After **the** resolution had been adopted, Prof J B Kriplani, the president of congress, delivered a brief speech which explained why congress had abandoned Gandhi's I have been with gandhijifor last thirty years, Kripalni continued "I joined him in champaran. I have never swayed in my loyalty to him. It is not a personal but a political loyalty, Even when I have differed with him I have considered his political instinct to be more correct them my elaborately reasoned attitudes. Today also, I fell *that he* with his supreme fearlessness is correct and my stand defective.

whenthen am I not with him? It is because I feel that he has as get found me way of tackling the problem on mass basis.' The nation was not responding to Gandhi's plea for peace and brotherhood." Gandhi considered a spirited tragedy.' He noted preparations for bloody strife. He saw partition the possibility of a military dictatorship and then 'goodly to freedom.' I do not agree with what my closet friends have done or **are** doing **we** said." During the communal holocaust in India in 1946-47, gandhiconclusively Hindus and Muslim equally rebuked him on **the fore** bone. Accordingly to Pyarelal, nearly as percent of post received by gandhiwas filled with abuses. There were wide demonstrations against him and a **night** attack on his "death, the refugees abused him."

As a successful negotiator **the** lord Mountbatten was on June 2, 1947, be **called** a conference of the leaders of the major sections of the Indian opinion- **the** congress and the Muslim league and a representative of the Sikhs at which there was a sort of method preparation for accepting the partition of the country. On **the** same day the viceroy was able to persuade gandhiof the necessity and compulsion of accepting the partition plan. It was gandhisday of silence but he wrote friendly note on the back of an envelope and the viceroy heaved a **sigh** of relief. Mountbatten commended those features of his plan which conformed to Gandhi's view and then explained why he did not agree with gandhi'sview. In the end he was able to persuade gandhijithat the partition plan was the best under the circumstance Gandhi, barred for arguing seemed affirmative notes. He attempted to alter or frustrate such a disastrous decision of working committee through in principle he was totally hostile to the two nation theory.

3 June plan

On June4 for after the British Government declaration Gandhi said, he had already told then

over and over again than to yield and each to force wholly wrong. The working committee held that **they had** to yield to the force of the circumstance. The vast majority of congressmen did not want to unwilling partners. Their motto was not violence and therefore no coercion. Hence after careful weighing of the pros and cons of **the** vital issues at stake, they had reluctantly agreed to the succession from the Indian union that was the being formed of those parts which had boycotted the constituent assembly". **He** then expressed sorrow at what he considered to be a mistaken policy of the Muslim *League*. He did not blame lord Mountbatten for what had happened to him the congress and the Muslim league were responsible for partition. Gandhi defended his the he want a united India but he was a powerless *in* the face of **the** acceptance of the congress of **the** Muslim league's demand. Gandhi received of a number of protests from all over the country. Many people blamed the congress and Gandhi of women correspondent advised Gandhi to **retire** to the forest of it was he who had spoilt *Jinnah* and turned his head and was open declaration congress for the evil that the country fared. Gandhi was bitter and on the defensive for his own action and that of the congress.

Hodson has vividly describe the event: A few day after the announcement the viceroy was told that Mr. Gandhi was in a very wretched emotional mood and might denounce the plan at his next prayer meeting.

Lord Mountbatten asked Gandhi to come round for the talk.

In the first place Gandhi had pressed the Viceroy to try to **get** the **Cabinet** Mission Plan of retaining the Unity of India **accepted** by all the leaders, providing that it did not involve coercion of violence.

The Cabinet Mission

The three main communities recognized for this purpose **were** General (all non-Muslim and non-Sikhs), Muslim and Sikh. The communal composition of the Constituent Assembly was to be as follow:

Unable, despite every effort to follow first part of the advise. Lord Mountbatten the second part and had not insisted on encouraging a scheme with grave risk of violent resistance. Secondly Mr. Gandhi's advise had been to leave the choice of their Indian People. It was **who** had given Lord Mountbatten ideas of le provinces choose as the simplest and forest way of carrying out that the advise. Thirdly Mr. gandhi had urged that the British should quit india and transfer power as soon as possible.

Gandhi address the AICC commended the working committee Resolution and pleaded working committee as their representatives had accepted the plan and it was the duty of the AICC to stand by them. **He** said those was talked in terms of immediate revolution of an upheaval in the in country would achieve it by throwing out this resolution but he heasked if they had the strength to take over the reins of the congress and the Government? Well, I have not the strength to today, or else I would declare rebellion today...if the AICC felt so strongly on this point that plan would do a lot of injury to the country, then it could reject the plan. The consequence of such a rejection would the finding of a new set of leaders who could constitute not only the congress working committee but also take the charge of the government. If the opponents of the resolution could find such a set of leaders, the AICC would then reject the resolution, if it felt. *They* should not forget, at the same time, that the peace in the country **was** very essential at this juncture" Gandhi had steadfastly opposed the division of Indian. Yet **he** came **before** the AICC to urge the acceptance of resolution of India division. "Sometimes, certain division however unpalatable they might be, had to be taken. The AICC could reject the resolution of they could he certain that such a rejection would not lead to turmoil and strike in the country. The members of the congress working committee were old and tired leaders who were responsible for all the achievements of the congress hitherto and in fort, they formed the backbone of the congress and it would be most mouse, if not possible, to replace them at the mistakes something good emerged.

CONCLUSION- Gandhi said "I would have no hesitation in conceding the demondof Pakistan of I would be convened of its righteousness on that it is good for Islam. But I am firmilyconvinced *oneness* that the political demand to put forth muslimleague un Islamicand have not hestatedto all it a runful. Islam stand for the unity and brotherhood of mankind, not for disrupting the oneness of the nordid Gandhi's alternative of a mass struggle appliaedto them, struggle against whom? The British were goindand the Muslim league with its calculated

mixture of bluster and bullying, was hardly susceptible to the moral nuances of satyagraha.

To Nehru and Patel it seemed in the spring and summer of 1947 that Mahatmas idealism head outremthe needs of a critical and developing crises, that the intransigence of the Muslim league and the mounting choesin the country left no alternative to partition that to insists on unity under such circumstances was to court an even greater disaster Gandhi rock like faith in non-violence was admirable but to most his colleagues he seemed at the time an uncompromised prophet **rather** than a practical statesman..

Gandhi said "Today I find myself all alone even the sardar and Jawaharlal thinks that my reading of the situation is wrong and peace is sure to return if partition is agreed upon They did not like my telling **the** viceroy that even if there was to be partition, it should not be thought British rule.... They wonder if I have not deteriorated with age I shall perhaps not be alive to witness it, but should the evil. I apprehant overtake India and her independence be imperiled, **let** prosperity know what agony this old soul went throught thinking of it. Let isnot be said that Gandhi was party to India's vivisection.

On 6 July 1947, Gandhi gave speech at Prayer meeting, New **Delhi**, referring to arson, stabbing **and** bomb explosion in lohre Amritsar and Calcutta I am told with what **truth** I do not know, that the parties (**in** Lahore) are fairly matched and are bent **on** fighting it our. What the 'it' is I do not know. Is the suicidal strife to continues, Pakistan on no Pakistan? *Why* cannot the combatants honeslty came together and decide to stop arson and murder? Must **we** book to **the** ruling race to suppress **the** roits? The end of alien rule is imminent would to God our people stop this savagery and show mankind the better and better way.

Gandhi said "I feel helpless. One has to do the best **that** is possible under the circumstances. He said "I fell like a general without an army and complained as if the country, was not with him. He renewed his assurance that even if non Muslim India were with him, becould show the way to undo the proposed partition. This was untrue. Non Muslim India was always with him on this issue people asked him to launch a crusade against partition and promised him full support but refused. He wrote " **I**have no desire to launch any struggle against what promises to be an accomplished fact. I have considered such a division..... I would not carry on any agitation against that institution." Once he himself said "We must be prepared to displease the dearest ones for the sake of principles." But now he said "I have not that strength today or else. I would

declare rebellion single handed." This suggests that he was perhaps tired due to always and repeated failures. By now disciples were also quite tired and therefore in a hurry to see the end of the freedom struggle, even if they got an India reduced in size. At the AICC (14Jan, 1947) Nehru Admitted that "the congress leaders were past the prime of "their lives." They did not like wondering into the wilderness again." Later on Nehru said to Mosley," The truth is that we were **tried** men, and we were getting on in years two. **Few** of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again and if **we** had stood out for united India and if we wished it, prison again and if we had stood out for untied as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. Gandhi was surely opposed to partition, but he did not sporty defined his public position with **the** same force as he earlier opposed the cabaret mission plan. If despite, **the working** committee had averted **the** partition plan, Gandhi would not have been held responsible for **the** partition, burring the fact that his policies were slowly and imperceptibly leading to partition. He could as well have taken the people into confidence and laughed a Satyagrah against the AICC leadership which agreed to partition. But to state *this* to simplify the whole process of Gandhi performance and thinking. The Congress ever such he had assumed the stewardship had been consistently following partition.

The conclusion in an inescapable it is sad. On one side Gandhi had **no** strength on other side resistance against an obvious evil his occur side he had an abject fear of violence on other side had no strong say in division of country, otherside he blamed himself for partition, on other **side** guilty of abuses of Hindu community who accused him for partition. Herewas a tragic leadership which could not surmount the factors **and** forces operating under his or he was standing at crossroads, who didn't know where to go, nor was he able to mobilize and generate a mass movement against the division of the country. That he become a willing partner to **the** ghastly event of partition and blamed circumstances for it is a **pathetic** story of our times.

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