

## RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND CHINA

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### Abstract

*The state-to-state cross-border interactions and relations between Russia and China both have significant geopolitical, economic, and cultural ramifications. However, without synchronisation between the two tiers of relations, the two countries will never be able to be sure that their traumatic past would not be repeated. Geopolitically, whereas the Russia-China relationship primarily focuses on great-power interactions on a global scale, the Russian Far East-Northeast China relationship possibly represents a key influence in Northeast Asia and the greater Asia-Pacific Region. Cross-border relations between Russia and China are crucial in determining how much regionalism—which will also affect “the Koreas, Mongolia, and Japan”—will emerge in the “Northeast Asia” and how well Russia will be able to balance its reputation as a European power with the eagerly awaited status as an Asian power. The Russian Far East views China as a foreign civilization that surrounds its European outpost and as a country that seeks geopolitical control, starting with the demarcation, as well as striving to achieve geoeconomic superiority, initially through labour migration and trade.*

**Keywords:** Russia, China, Russian Far East, Northeast China, Cross-border Relation, Migration Dynamics, Demographic Expansion.

### INTRODUCTION

By the beginning of the 1990's, both the Soviet Union (Union Sovereign Socialist Republics) and China (People's Republic of China) had come to the conclusion that regional liberalisation was necessary, including in their relations with one another. This discernment, which was backed by the improvement in “state-to-state” ties not only endured but also gained importance after 1989, as the governments of the two countries became more aware of the consequences of the new geopolitical scenario.<sup>1</sup>

The Central Asian republics' independence, which reshaped the geopolitical landscape, had the unintended effect of making Northeast Asia more crucial as the centre of Russia-China bilateral relations. The matters of the regional growth and external orientation of the two countries' adjoining provinces “in the Russian Far East (RFE)” and the “three Dongbei provinces” of China – “Heilongjiang”,<sup>2</sup> “Jilin”<sup>3</sup> and “Liaoning”<sup>4</sup> – became intertwined with their economic ties.<sup>5</sup> But this also implied that the synergy between these territories' economic structures and levels of development, as well as the way their current external ties were structured, would also influence how the “opening” would proceed.

The RFE, which makes up “40% of Russia's total” land “area”, is a region abundant with “natural resources”, including “timber, silver, platinum, gold, diamonds, oil, natural gas, and tin.”<sup>6</sup> It also has some excellent “fishing grounds.” As a result, it has “strategic and economic” significance for Russia. There are “between six and seven million” people living in this area, which is around “4% of Russia's

overall population,” however the “population density” is quite “low.”<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the North Eastern provinces of China are growing “agricultural and industrial” regions. Therefore, it is evident that there is a “demographic” and “economic imbalance between the border regions,” which might get worse.<sup>8</sup>

State-to-state cross-border interactions and relations between Russia and China both have significant geopolitical, economic, and cultural ramifications. Cross-border ties, however, affect the dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations and even the balance of power because they involve a diverse group of actors with their own unique combination of local and national interests. Both the pace of change in these border interactions and the difficulty of getting them back on a positive track are notable. Without synchronisation between the two tiers of relations, Russia and China will never be able to be sure that their traumatic past would not be repeated.

### DIFFERENCES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

On the Chinese side, Heilongjiang Province receives the major attention because it contains formal border crossings and around three-quarters of the borderline. It is the focus of cross-border relations. While Jilin is significant for international trade. In fact, the major crossings at Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia and Hunchun in Jilin could be considered as two wings tightly attached to the expansive Heilongjiang head that protrudes into Russia. Liaoning, the third province of Northeast China (NEC) after Jilin, deserves consideration as well, despite not sharing a border with Russia. This is especially true given that Shenyang is home to the Russian consulate and Dalian is the principal port in the region.<sup>9</sup>

On the Russian side, Primorskii Krai,<sup>10</sup> which connects Heilongjiang and Jilin to the Sea of Japan, is the first among the prime border regions. Khabarovskii Krai,<sup>11</sup> another populous and prominent region of the RFE is the next. Amurskaya Oblast,<sup>12</sup> a farming region in the interior most reliant on China, comes next. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast, a small region reliant on Khabarovskii Krai, comes last. Other border regions, such the more interior Chitinskaya Oblast, are lower on the hierarchy and are recognised for serving as transit areas between China and the more significant administrative regions of eastern or western Siberia.

China is the second-biggest “trading partner (after South Korea)” for the entire Far East, the primary trade “partner for the border provinces” of that region, and a major “market for the region’s metals, coal, and lumber as well as a major provider of foodstuffs, clothing, and consumer electronics to locals.”<sup>13</sup> Russian President Vladimir Putin had in 2006 cited the “Far East’s socioeconomic isolation” and the inability to properly utilise its natural wealth as threats to Russia’s “national security” as well as to its “political and economic position in the Asia-Pacific.”<sup>14</sup>

Geopolitically, whereas the Russia-China relationship primarily focuses on great-power interactions on a global scale, the RFE-NEC relationship possibly represents a key influence in Northeast Asia (NEA) and the greater Asia-Pacific Region (APR). Cross-border relations between Russia and China are crucial in determining how much regionalism—which will also affect the Koreas, Mongolia, and Japan—will emerge in the NEA and how well Russia will be able to balance its reputation as a European power with the eagerly awaited status as an Asian power. Russia has determined to achieve a dominant status in Northeast Asia, bringing with it extensive access to East Asia as well as full

membership privileges in the APR. “Russia’s influence in Central Asia” and potential connection to India in South Asia alone do not accomplish this ambition. By the fall of 1992, Russia had decided to play a balancing role in the more unstable Asian region after realising that it could only advance to the position of a junior partner in the well-institutionalized systems of Europe and the West. Russia increasingly looked to China as an equal partner. However, the contentious topic of China’s border demarcation eventually hampered relations in the RFE. The problem faded into obscurity when delineation was finished in November 1997.

The stakes near the border are similarly high for China. NEC surpasses the RFE in terms of the population, industrial complex, military might, and strength of ingrained notions of its proper place in a rising nation. Chinese plans to reshape the globe, and particularly the regional order, depend on the consolidation of Greater China at the entrance to Southeast Asia and on a geopolitical order in NEA. Through cooperation across their common border, Russia and China may forge a unified front that can influence events “on the Korean peninsula,” restrain “Japan’s influence in the region,” and keep the United States at a distance.<sup>15</sup>

Russian-Chinese border relations are extremely important geoeconomically for the development of Russia’s natural resources. Projects to harness the massive reserves of raw materials and energy deposits in Siberia and the RFE are typically the cornerstone of discussions about building new or reviving existing Eurasian land bridges, vast networks of energy pipelines, and expanding Pacific ports. Due to the loss of territory caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia now resembles Asia far more in terms of its distribution of land, accessibility to ports with warm waters, and prospective economic strength. Even though the Asian regions of Russia appear underdeveloped and thinly populated when viewed from Moscow, many inside and outside the country say that these regions have some strengths. Russia is greatly tempted to join the vibrant NEA development engine in order to experience fast growth, tying its Far East to the nearby provinces of China as well as Japan in the process. The objective is clear, but the means and the order of importance are hotly contested. Economic ties have been questioned as a result of geostrategic concern and geocultural conflicts in the Far East.

Many people in NEC were enthralled by the idea of an economic powerhouse developing once the Tumen River area project (Tumen) was started at the intersection of Jilin, Primorskii Krai, and North Korea and economic relations strengthen in NEA. In handling Sino-Russian relations across the border, they have looked for a game-changing initiative as a method of extending coastal dynamism to what is thought of as an inland region; as a way to revive the area that still represents the encumbrance of debt-ridden, massive state-owned companies; and as a necessity for overcoming national disparities in order to set reform and openness on an unstoppable trajectory.

In an effort to decrease its reliance on the West, Russia sought out Asian allies under the banner of “Eurasianism”, which helped to galvanise support. But because this is such a broad notion, there are many possible interpretations.

Chinese people take pride in their own civilization and make an effort to celebrate the achievements generally credited to Eastern civilisation, yet they are aware of the cultural contrasts that exist on their northern border. The practical problems seen in recent years, which might fuel concerns left

over from years of venomous charges by both sides, are rarely concealed by references to Russia's special historical ties of friendship.

### **MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN THE RFE**

Trade and connections along the border have greatly risen since the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1988–1989. Around 10,000 unmarried, male Chinese labourers were lawfully employed in the Russian Far East in 1994, whereas only a few thousand Russians were working in China. Traders crossed “the Sino-Russian border in the two cities of Heihe and Suifenhe on average 2,000 times per day in 1993.”<sup>16</sup>

At first, the Russian border districts welcomed the normalisation of relations and the expanding “prospects for economic cooperation” with tremendous “enthusiasm”. Elites in the area and the ordinary populace both sought to profit from their proximity to China, the growth of border trade, and their direct interactions with the governments and corporations in the neighbouring Chinese provinces. Due to other policies that effectively reopened “a border” sealed for many years and eliminated visa requirements for business travel, these ties were allowed to develop during the later years of the Soviet Union. In the late 1980's, Russian customers in the border regions turned to China mostly due to the internal market's near-emptiness, as Gilbert Rozman noted:

The Chinese were closest, arrived first, offered the cheapest goods, bought items of marginal quality, and did not require hard currency. . . . The Chinese had no compunctions about trade and seemed to know how to cut deals with minimal formality and paperwork. As government contracts declined rapidly in 1990-92 while local and border trade flourished, the role of these unregulated traders became decisive. The model of bilateral economic relations was abruptly changing without forethought and oversight into the possible consequences.<sup>17</sup>

With the blessing of the regional government, “companies in the Russian Far East” started hiring Chinese contract workers starting in 1992, following a “bilateral agreement” between Russia and China. Regional governments were given the power to set “the number of foreign” employees in their jurisdictions to maintain a “balance” between the “supply and demand”<sup>18</sup> of labour, as per the Russian Federation's Employment Law.<sup>19</sup> As a result, China became the RFE's top trading partner, primarily “through border trade.”<sup>20</sup>

“The RFE's trade with China” was quite small “in 1985,” making up “only 10 per cent of the total,” but it increased significantly, accounting for about “34 per cent” of the total in 1992, “second only to trade with Japan.”<sup>21</sup> Despite being “the third-largest investor in the RFE,” China's “investments” are not favourably appreciated because of its substantial reliance on trade and the production of consumer products.<sup>22</sup> Local government authorities prefer that “foreign investment take the form of joint ventures” in the creation of “processing industries”, basic infrastructure, and natural resource “development”.<sup>23</sup> This strategy is primarily used by investors from Japan and the United States. Early 1993 surveys found that local authorities “in the southern Primorskii Krai” preferred to collaborate “with Americans (64 per cent), Japanese (44 per cent), South Koreans (16 per cent), and Chinese (4 per cent).”<sup>24</sup>

Both Russia and China believe that bilateral economic cooperation is unavoidable given the current state of the world economy and the ways in which the two countries have implemented their economic reforms. Chinese academics ascribe the sharp increase in Russo-Chinese “trade and Chinese investment in the RFE” to two factors: (1) the appreciably deteriorated “economic” ties “between the RFE and Russia, other former Soviet republics, and East European” nations as a result of the dissolution of “the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance”; and (2) the RFE’s great “complementarity” with Northeast China.<sup>25</sup> China imports steel, chemical fertilisers, machinery, and wood from the RFE while exporting food and consumer products to it. Additionally, the gaps left by the RFE’s move “from a command economy to a market economy”<sup>26</sup> opened doors for traders and small private manufacturers. Because there were few “long-term investments” in the “industries” of “resource” extraction and “processing” due to “Russia’s political and economic instability,” these traders and investors often sought short-term benefits. However, the Chinese thought they could aid Russia, and the RFE in particular, in developing their resource base, resource processing, and even exporting finished goods. They also thought that future trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia will be enhanced by political stability in both countries.<sup>27</sup>

### THE QUESTION OF “DEMOGRAPHIC EXPANSION”

The growing “demographic pressure from the Chinese side and the demographic” shortfall “in the Russian Far East”<sup>28</sup> were two of the most significant effects of this era of prosperous cross-border economic cooperation. The indigenous “population” of the RFE began to drop from the early 1990’s, as local population growth was overtaken by “emigration”,<sup>29</sup> as a result of the regional economic crisis and the termination of state-sponsored immigration.<sup>30</sup> There may have been a drop of more than a quarter of a million people since 1992.<sup>31</sup> Even though this would only result in a 3.3 per cent decrease in the population of the RFE, it was obviously “unsustainable” over the “long run” and created the appearance that the “Russian settlement” in the region was eroding.<sup>32</sup> In view of this, the sharp increase in border crossings from China assumed a menacing quality. In 1992, China had “1.38 million” border crossings in both directions and “1.76 million in 1993.”<sup>33</sup>

Because of the Chinese population in the RFE, locals began to worry increasingly about a Chinese “demographic expansion”. In a study conducted in Russia, nearly half of the participants expressed concern that within the next ten years, the proportion of Chinese people in the area could rise to 20–40 per cent of the total. Another 20 per cent said the percentage may rise to between 40 and 60 percent.<sup>34</sup> Articles on the claimed “yellow peril”<sup>35</sup> started appearing in regional newspapers and even academic journals, alleging that China had a systematic programme of resettling its surplus population in the northeastern provinces of the RFE and Siberia under the pretence of economic cooperation. It is said that this policy was implemented at the expense of Russian workers in order to address the issues of overpopulation<sup>36</sup> and unemployment. Additionally, it was argued that this strategy was setting the framework for future Chinese efforts to assert China’s historical ownership of those Russian areas.<sup>37</sup> China is said to have employed fake tourist trips to achieve this purpose (after which participants “did not return to China” but rather settled “in Russia”). “Fake invitations” to conduct research visits from Russian universities existed, and fictitious marriages were utilised to get residency permits. In the Russian Federation in 1993-1994, an estimated 200,000–2,000,000 illegal Chinese immigrants were present.<sup>38</sup> Primorskii (Maritime) Krai’s governor, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, asserted that about “150,000 Chinese” were overstaying “in Primorskii Krai alone.”<sup>39</sup> Businesspeople from China were charged with profiteering “from privatisations”, causing “housing



shortages,” and escalating “unemployment” figures. They were also blamed for the rise in crime rates in border communities.<sup>40</sup> It was asserted that a plan to build Chinese villages and communities on Russian soil was adopted by the Chinese government, possibly at the provincial or ministerial level. One analyst in Vladivostok predicted that within 30 years, a Chinese autonomous province would be founded there.<sup>41</sup>

Moreover, it was claimed that Chinese “joint ventures” were managed by mafia-style organisations and intelligence services in China (which were also considered to be in service of Chinese national interests), and that they used fictitious Russian firms to acquire Russian companies, properties, and land.

The increased reliance of the RFE on China, particularly Northeast China, caused concern among the governments at Moscow and the regional capitals. The RFE’s autonomy and sovereignty were seen as being threatened by the growing number of Chinese workers, traders, and businesses given its small and declining population,<sup>42</sup> especially at a time when China was energetically promoting its surplus labour force to work across the border. The unchecked influx of “Chinese” workers and traders, “some of whom stayed in Russia”<sup>43</sup> for an extended period of time or even lived there, reawakened long-standing concerns in the sparsely inhabited Far Eastern areas that the regions may become predominately Chinese. The future mobility of labour across border crossings will be influenced by ongoing security issues regarding Chinese border crossings.

Although Moscow has made goodwill overtures towards China, the RFE does not want economic cooperation with its neighbours, particularly the Northeastern region of China. Moscow is seen as draining the resources of the region, stifling regional growth, and restricting regional relations with the RFE’s Asian neighbours.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to opposing joint infrastructure development, Nazdratenko and his fellow governors of the Far East (Yevgeni Krasnoyarov of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Vladimir Polevanov of Amurskaya Oblast, and Viktor Ishaev of Khabarovskii Krai) charged that China was attempting to colonise Russia and use its resources for its own economic gain.

“The Tumen River Project,” which was sponsored “by China’s Jilin province” and funded by “the United Nations Development Programme,”<sup>45</sup> was the most conspicuous casualty of these conflicts. The project, which was started in 1991, aimed to unite “China, Mongolia, North and South Korea, and Russia” to create “a trade and development zone at the Tumen River Delta’s mouth.”<sup>46</sup> The proposal was advanced by China, the two Koreas, and Mongolia; however, the RFE politicians vehemently opposed it. China was charged with wanting to utilise the project to avoid Russian processing and transportation infrastructure and get access to the Sea of Japan in order to facilitate more illegal immigration.<sup>47</sup> According to the local (Primorskii Krai) opinion, “its implementation” would substantially affect “the ethnic composition of the krai’s population,” put Russian economic and political interests in jeopardy, and inevitably cause instability “and a loss by the Primorskii Krai of its Russian appearance.”<sup>48</sup> In 1997, the chief admiral of Russia warned that this project was more than just a dispute over navigational rights and that China intended to deepen the river and amass a fleet that would change the balance of naval power in the Sea of Japan. The overwhelming Chinese backing for the project at both the central and local levels contrasts with the scepticism of the Russians.

Local business executives in the Far East exploited racial prejudice to pressure provincial “governments”, who themselves “were not” averse to playing “the anti-Chinese card”, to restrict “Chinese economic” participation.<sup>49</sup> The main issue that “the new business elites in the Far East” had with Chinese economic contacts, aside from the competition in the purchase of businesses and real estate, “was that Chinese goods were priced too low.”<sup>50</sup> These competed with costlier and lucrative “hard currency imports” from the Western and “Pacific” countries.<sup>51</sup> Similar pressures on the central government came from influential financial and trading groups in Moscow that wanted to keep Chinese competitors out of their markets. Russian officials unilaterally decided to block the border due to pressure from the public and particularly from regional governments. A new visa system was implemented in January 1994.<sup>52</sup> Later that year, a number of local governments adopted policies to deal with Chinese immigrants who were coming there illegally. Following that, the proportion of Chinese decreased.<sup>53</sup> Roughly 100 Chinese and 500 Russians crossed the border each day at Heihe in the beginning of 1995. The Far East was home to between 1000 and 2000 illegal immigrants, according to the Chinese.<sup>54</sup> Tourists without the necessary documentation were not permitted to enter Russia, and foreigners could only be assigned to hotels that were approved and conduct business in venues that were also approved. Travel agencies were given the responsibility of taking all tourists home. Operation Inostranets (Foreigner), a campaign by the local administration in the Maritime Krai to apprehend and return illegal immigrants (mainly Chinese), was launched on multiple occasions. All of these actions contributed to a substantial reduction in cross-border trade and collaboration by significantly reducing the number of Chinese travelling to Russia and Chinese residents in the RFE.<sup>55</sup>

On December 1-3, 2002, Putin paid a state visit to China. During that trip, the two countries made a declaration that they would work together to combat illegal immigration.<sup>56</sup>

After a long interval, Russia conducted the “East 2010” military drill in 2010, sending “two divisions across Siberia by train” to rehearse “tactical nuclear strikes” against an unknown external aggressor. Many people believed that this was a signal to China. It is posited that “the unequal treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860)”, recognised Russian sovereignty “over Primorye and Transbaikal,”<sup>57</sup> may come under scrutiny from a more confident and powerful China.<sup>58</sup>

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev declared in August 2012 that the RFE must be safeguarded against the disproportionate influx of residents from nearby nations, and that the state must endeavour to avoid the detrimental effects of “migration”, such as “foreign workers enclaves.”<sup>59</sup> He also stated that out of the 10 million migrants in Russia, 8 million had arrived in the first half of 2012, indicating the necessity of managing migration.<sup>60</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Geopolitical considerations form the basis of the “Sino-Russian strategic partnership”. However, there is scant evidence that the groups responsible for economic development planning share these interests. Local border communities each have their own unique goals, which in the RFE veer away from China and in the NEC remain centred on Russia.

The core of this “partnership” is an equitable collaboration meant to balance great-power relations

in the region and worldwide. Cross-border relationships have been troublesome because they reveal a power and potential imbalance. The RFE views China as a foreign civilization that surrounds its European outpost and as a country that seeks geopolitical control, starting with the demarcation, as well as striving to achieve geoeconomic superiority, initially through labour migration and trade. Integration with NEC poses a threat of inequity and a loss of great-power status rather than any sort of balance to the surroundings they are most familiar with.

Therefore, Russia faces a strange conundrum in the Far East. Contrastingly, it appears that “China and” the greater “Asia Pacific region” must be integrated with the region in order “for the Far East” to expand economically and keep Russian control of the area. However, given China’s strong involvement in the area “through trade and investment”, Moscow is concerned about the possibility of “Chinese political and economic” domination,<sup>61</sup> so that is why Russia intended to “develop” the area to begin with. Russia does not want the area to turn into a hinterland for China rather than serving as its own gateway “to the Asia Pacific.”<sup>62</sup>

With the signing of “an agreement in September 2009, known as the Program of Cooperation between the Regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia and the Northeast of the People’s Republic of China, 2009-2018”,<sup>63</sup> Russia gave China a privileged position in its economic plan for the Far East. In 2013, Putin called for wisely using “China’s potential” to boost the economies “of Siberia and the Far East.”<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, a lot of “social security programmes” in Russia could only be put into action if money was made by exploiting the natural wealth in the Far East. China will consequently have a significant part in the development of the area due to its capacity to fund large-scale “projects”, enormous availability of inexpensive workforce, and its “accessibility to the Far East”.<sup>65</sup> There are possibilities of Russia and China cooperating in developing “industrial and infrastructure projects in the RFE-Baikal regions”<sup>66</sup> with significant implications for the two.

Even so, certain Russian actions—like granting China a share “in an oil field in Eastern Siberia in 2013”—suggest Moscow is progressively getting over its anxiety of “Chinese” expansion “into the Far East.”<sup>67</sup> Maybe this was bound to happen and is a harbinger of future events. Russian entry “into the Asia Pacific” region also appears to be welcomed by China. In September 2010, Russia and China issued a communiqué, committing themselves “to an open, transparent and equal framework for security and cooperation in the region, which shall be based on international laws and non-alliance principles, taking into account” the “legitimate rights and interests”<sup>68</sup> of all countries. They also urged the creation of “a security” regime “based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”.<sup>69</sup> While meeting Putin in October 2013 on the occasion of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested cooperation between Russia and China in order to ensure “the security and stability in the Asia-Pacific” countries, considering the area being a shared interest for them.<sup>70</sup>

Alternatively, Russians may be more open to a compromise option like “managed” collaboration since it would direct the current process of natural emergence from below towards a more organised relationship and institutionalisation of these economic ties. It would be crucial in this case to improve the interoperability of RFE’s economic system with that of the neighbouring economies. Instead of being an obstructionist, the government should act as a facilitator and mediator for its citizens. By working along with other countries, the RFE may open up more prospects while maintaining a



satisfactory level of security.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Russia, China and the Far East: Old Geopolitics or New Peaceful Cooperation," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995.
- <sup>2</sup> Also HEILUNGKIANG. A province of Northeast China, on the Russian frontier; capital, Harbin.
- <sup>3</sup> Also KIRIN. A province of Northeast China; capital, Changchun.
- <sup>4</sup> A province of Northeast China, bordered on the east by North Korea; capital, Shenyang.
- <sup>5</sup> See David Kerr, "Opening and closing the Sino-Russian border: Trade, regional development and political interest in north-east Asia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 6, September 1996, pp. 931-957.
- <sup>6</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *Trends in Russia-China Relations Implications for India*, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2015, p. 70.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- <sup>9</sup> A port and shipbuilding center on the Liaodong Peninsula in Northeast China, now part of the urban complex of Luda. Former name DAIREN.
- <sup>10</sup> Also MARITIME KRAI. A krai in the far southeast of Siberian Russia, between the Sea of Japan and the Chinese border; capital, Vladivostok.
- <sup>11</sup> A krai (administrative territory) on the east coast of Siberian Russia.
- <sup>12</sup> Oblast is "an administrative division or region in Russia and the former Soviet Union, and in some constituent republics of former Soviet Union."
- <sup>13</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *op. cit.*, p. 73. See also Rens Lee, "The Far East between Russia, China, and America", July 2012, available at <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.lee.fareast.pdf>.
- <sup>14</sup> constituent republics of former Soviet Union."
- <sup>14</sup> "Isolation of Russian Far East Threat to National Security—Putin", *RIA Novosti*, 20 December 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061220/57396954.html>. Quoted in Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- <sup>15</sup> Michał Lubina, *Russia and China: A political marriage of convenience – stable and successful*, Barbara Budrich Publishers, Opladen, 2017.
- <sup>16</sup> Won Bae Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East: A Porous Border", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 12, 1994, pp. 1064–1076. See also Andrei Admidin, "Utilisation of Foreign Labour Force in the Russian Far East: Problems and Prospects," *mimeograph*, Economic Research Institute, Khabarovsk, 1993.
- <sup>17</sup> Gilbert Rozman, *Sino-Russian Cross-Border Relations: Turning Fortresses into Trade Zones*, Princeton, N.J., 1997, p. 7.
- <sup>18</sup> Won Bae Kim, *op. cit.*
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* See also Economic Research Institute, *Russian Far Eastern Yearbook*, 1991, first issue, Economic Research Institute, Khabarovsk, 1993.
- <sup>20</sup> Won Bae Kim, *ibid.* Andrei Admidin, "Utilisation of Foreign Labour Force in the Russian Far East: Problems and Prospects," *op. cit.*
- <sup>21</sup> Won Bae Kim, *ibid.* See also Japan External Trade Organization, *Present Foreign Trade Situation in the Russian Far East*, 1993, pp. 41-42.

<sup>22</sup> Won Bae Kim, *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* See also Gilbert Rozman, "Prospects for a Regional Community Linking the Russian Far East and the Chinese Northeast," *The American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies*, Honolulu, November 1993.

<sup>25</sup> Won Bae Kim, *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz (Eds.), *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald*, July 2010, available at [https://archive.org//stream/ThePlaAtHomeAndAbroadAssessingTheOperationalCapabilitiesOfChinas/23-RussianMil\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org//stream/ThePlaAtHomeAndAbroadAssessingTheOperationalCapabilitiesOfChinas/23-RussianMil_djvu.txt) (Accessed on 15-11-2022).

<sup>27</sup> Ding Sibao and Wang Li, *A Study on Regional Models for External Opening in Inland Border Areas* (Changchun: Dongbei Shifan Daxue Chubanshi), 1994, pp. 51-54.

<sup>28</sup> David Kerr, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Pavel A. Minakir & Gregory L. Freeze, eds., *The Russian Far East, An Economic Handbook*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup> Far East Population figures for 1992 are in Pavel A. Minakir & Gregory L. Freeze, *op. cit.*, p. 29; and for 1994 in *Russian Business Monitor*, 1995, No. 2, p. 6.

<sup>32</sup> See Dmitri V. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001), p. 218. See also David Kerr, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> "Rethink border trade strategy," *Bohai Shangbao*, Shenyang, 19 July 1994, in JPRS-CAR-94-046, p. 41.

<sup>34</sup> Mikhail Alexseev, "The Chinese Are Coming: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East," *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security: Policy Memo 184* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2001).

<sup>35</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>36</sup> See Yevgeny Volin, "Beijing Throws Down A Strategic Gage to Moscow," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No. 8, p. 11, 20 January 2004, in *RIA-NOVOSTI Daily Review*, No. 258, 20 January 2004, pp. 2-3.

<sup>37</sup> See Vassily Likhachev, "Russia-China Strategic Partnership," *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1997, pp. 39-41; Dmitri V. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>38</sup> Rajan Menon, "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 105.

<sup>39</sup> Vladimir Portyakov, "Are the Chinese Coming? Migration Processes in Russia's Far East," *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol. 42, No. 1, January-February 1996, <http://home.eastview.com/ia/index.html>.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> James Clay Moltz, "Core and Periphery in the Evolving Russian Economy: Integration or Isolation of the Far East", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol. 37, No. 3, March 1996, p. 185.

<sup>42</sup> Won Bae Kim, *op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *op. cit.*, p. 81. See also Alexander Lukin, "Perceptions of China Threat in Russia and Russian-Chinese Relations," paper presented at an International Conference on "China: Threat Perceptions from Different Continents," Hong Kong, January 11-12, 2001, <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/russiachina.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> John Stephen, "The Russian Far East," *Current History*, October 1993, pp. 331-36.

- <sup>45</sup> Jennifer Anderson, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, Adelphi Paper 315, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, New York, 1997, pp. 25-45.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> Icksoo Kim, "Tumen River Development and Economic Cooperation", *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 1995, p. 88.
- <sup>48</sup> Ludmila Zabrovskaya, "The Tumanggang Project: A View from Primorie," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 1, 1995, pp. 34-38.
- <sup>49</sup> David Kerr, op. cit., pp. 931-957.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Alexander Lukin, "The Image of China in Russian Border Regions," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 8, August 1998, p. 826.
- <sup>53</sup> David Kerr, op. cit., p. 950.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Alexander Lukin, "The Image of China In Russian Border Regions," op. cit., p. 826.
- <sup>56</sup> "Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China," signed on December 2, 2002, in Beijing, *RIA-NOVOSTI Daily Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 230, December 2, 2002, p. 8.
- <sup>57</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, op. cit., p. 84.
- <sup>58</sup> See Dmitri V. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, op. cit., pp. 325-26.
- <sup>59</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, op. cit., p. 81.
- <sup>60</sup> "Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev Chairs a Government Meeting", 9 August 2012, [government.ru/eng/docs/20062/](http://government.ru/eng/docs/20062/). Quoted in Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 81.
- <sup>61</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85. See also Natasha Kuhrt, *Russian Policy towards China and Japan: The El'tsin and Putin Periods*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 166.
- <sup>63</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78. See also Vladimir Putin, "Russia and the Changing World", *Moskovskie Novosti*, 27 February 2013, translated by *RIA Novosti* and published at <http://russiaprofile.org/politics/54998.html>.
- <sup>65</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* See also Rens Lee, "The Far East between Russia, China, and America", op. cit.
- <sup>67</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 85. See also Wayne Ma and Lukas Alpert, "Russia Lets Down Guard on China", *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 October 2013.
- <sup>68</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 85. See also "China, Russia call for efforts in Asia-Pacific security", *China Daily*, 28 September 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/28/content\\_11361116.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/28/content_11361116.htm).
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> Nandan Unnikrishnan and Uma Purushothaman, *ibid.*, p. 85. See also "China to join Russia in maintaining security in Asia-Pacific: Xi", 8 October 2013, [http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-10/08/content\\_30220452.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-10/08/content_30220452.htm).