# PEACE BUILDING AND MEDIATION IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUILDING AND MEDIATION IN SOMALIA

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*Abstract*

*This article **'Peace Building and Mediation in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Previous Local and International Peace Building and Mediation in Somalia'** investigates the origins and key drivers of the war in Somalia as well as diplomatic measures aimed at finding a long-term solution to the conflict. Despite this, Somalia is considered to be a country with a population that is ethnically, religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous. Nonetheless, their similarity did not save them from becoming embroiled in one of the world's worst conflicts, which claimed the lives of thousands of Somalis. The fall of President Said Barre's administration in 1991 triggered the crisis, and no significant improvements have occurred since then. The paper sought to comprehend the history of local peacebuilding in Somalia through mediation efforts. The paper also sought to determine the importance of grassroot mediation in resolving continuing conflicts in Somalia. Additionally, the research aimed to explain why the majority of peace endeavors failed, despite the fact that the past three peacebuilding conferences ended in a meaningful resolution. This study also demonstrates the significance of local peacebuilding efforts whereby it shines a light on underappreciated local peacebuilding efforts, demonstrating that peacebuilding efforts are not limited to foreign, regional, and international entities. In this regard, the conclusion provides various recommendations and the very best method to create long-term peace and prosperity for the citizens of Somalia.*

*Keywords: Africa, Conflict, Peace-building, Mediation, Somalia.*

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## INTRODUCTION

The globe experienced prominence in the pursuit of peace in conflict-dominated states throughout the post-Cold War era. With the establishment of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, the reinvigorated push for peacebuilding got significant support. The implication was increased vitality in peacebuilding activities, the expansion of organizations entrusted with fostering peace, and growth in peacebuilding studies (Curtis, 2012).

Most peacebuilding interventions and involvement have been centered on ensuring liberal structures via their peacebuilding practices by international institutions and organizations. Most African crisis nations have received peacekeeping assistance from a variety of organizations using flexible techniques and processes. In the practice of peacebuilding, the neglect of local and grassroots peacebuilding efforts has damaged various frameworks of diplomacy and negotiation in the creation of durable peace in African governments (Hoffman, 2006). The result has been a breach of lasting peace in most African countries, which remain in a state of instability.

A successful system for peacebuilding in Africa should be able to guide trust, rehabilitate conflict-ridden societies, promote reconciliation and social justice. This argument, in reference, explains the necessity for inclusive negotiation, peace education, people-to-people initiatives, ideas, and practices (Curtis, 2012; Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al., 2011). In other words, given the nature of Africa's persistent wars, a more localized approach to peacebuilding may be more sustainable.

Somalia's conflict has been raging for over three decades, beginning with a deadly civil war that gradually evolved into a war on terrorism. Three generations have been affected by the devastation caused by the fighting that began in 1991. Despite various peace initiatives, it appears that there has been little headway in ending the ongoing conflict. That is, clan-based hostilities have caused the country to be classified as a failed state.

Somalia has yet to have a stable government. Fragments such as Somaliland and Puntland, as well as the ongoing Al-Shabaab insurgency, have rendered the country unfit for long-term stability. Lake (2014) recalls that the fall of Barre's authoritarian leadership ushered in a clannism culture in Somalia. That is, clans were moved from egalitarian societies to hierarchical structures because public service delivery was based on clannism. This arrangement has made establishing a functional state nearly impossible, with private bodies serving as key suppliers of public services (Abdullah, 2006).

Previous efforts to stabilize and achieve permanent peace have relied heavily on liberal peacebuilding methods. This means establishing peace frameworks that bring together foreign players and high-ranking government, opposition, and militia group leaders while generally neglecting grassroots-based institutions. There have been repeated liberal/top-down/paternalistic

peacebuilding initiatives in Africa's warring nations over the last two or more decades, with little or no meaningful advances in the transition to peace. When grassroots leaders are participating in a peace-seeking endeavor, their opinions are rarely given much weight. As a result, the notion of local players in addressing conflict-underlying concerns in Somalia has been alienated, leaving the nation split and contentious along ethnic lines.

## FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR OF SOMALIA

Following many years of conflict between Britain and Italy, Somalia attained independence in June 1960. Upon their independence, the Somalia Republic chose to retake the regions occupied by Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya at the time and administered by the French Administration (Rupesinghe, 1995). This fueled the emergence of 'Pan-Somali nationalism,' which alarmed neighboring nations. The Somalis fought to reclaim two major provinces that the colonial had ceded to neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya (Galtung, 1996).

Somalia's democracy can be described as brief because it was interrupted by the military following the unexplained killing of democratically elected President Abdirashid Sharmake in 1969. While the democratic process was stymied, the country saw rapid transformations on a local and worldwide scale. By 1974, the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) strained African relationship had been repaired thanks to the new relationship with the Arab League. In 1977, seven years after declaring itself a communist state, Somalia launched a war against Ethiopia in the expectation of getting Soviet backing (Tripodi, 1999, pp. 49–74).

While being a theoretically autonomous state, Somalia was not free of neocolonialization under the cover of mission and political philosophy. The colonizers' strategy of divide and rule brought division among the Somali people. This created hatred and hostility among various clans in Somalia, whereby they fought for dominance and territory. The same can be said about the United States (US) and western countries as well, whereby they use the concept of foreign aid to dismantle the country's natural resources (Galtung, 1996).

## THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOMALI STATE AND THE POST-1991 CONFLICT STATE

Somalia's civil war began with the overthrow of President Said Barre in 1991, ending the military regime that had administered the country since 1969. The opposition shared a single point of view, which was to depose the dictatorship from power, but they lacked a replacement strategy and a unifying objective. This battle marked the start of a long civil war that destroyed all Somali administrative structures and livelihood mechanisms, broke law and order, and resulted in mass murders and fragmented clan-based territories administered by warlords (Mulugeta, 2009, pp. 9–12).

President Said Barre's popularity in Somalia plummeted during the disastrous war with Ethiopia. As a dictator, he was not recognized by local clans during his rule. In 1991, he was compelled to resign, leaving Somalia without a functioning government. The demise of Somalia's national government resulted in the nation's fragmentation into several minor self-proclaimed entities, such as Somaliland (JamesJan, 1995).

Long conflict in Somalia deliberately impacted competition based on political, economic, and misappropriation of Somalia's national resources via numerous clans. The key resources that prompted the wars were fertile lands, high-quality crops, pastoral land, water supplies, and the use of nation-wide infrastructure such as seaports or airports. Somalia's Puntland autonomous Region

chose to rebuild a central government, whilst Somalia's Central-South sought to restore a centralized government. Local clans formed alliances to profit from the resource while competing violently for control of the territory (BBC, 2018).

Somalia is known to be the most damaged country in Africa because the state has existed for less than fifty dreadful years and the country has been at war for most of its history. When the authoritarian military dictatorship was toppled, the country was thrust into two crucial scenarios. The first involved cruel warlords, and the second involved Islamic warriors, who brought in foreign fighters (Beardsley et al., 2006, pp. 58-86).

In 2012, the country formed a permanent administration that was completely supported by the international community, and the country began to experience a small level of stability once more. The federal system of government was introduced and welcomed by some of the political elites, but the Somali population believed that the new system of government would increase the divide between the Somali people. This new system was seen and is still seen as a major roadblock to the unity of the Somali people. Each and every region in Somalia has their own flag and their own form of government whereby the central government oversees the regions. This has allowed regional leaders to meet foreign diplomats without the permission and oversight of the central government. Many argue that this form of government enabled neo-colonialism, where foreign powers made deals with regional leaders to utilize the natural resources of the country.

## INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA

Christiane E. Phillips offers a conversation starter. 'How did the United Nations (UN) engage in Somalia?' According to Christiane, the genuine armed conflict inside Somalia was first and foremost a threat to the Horn of Africa as a whole, and secondly to neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia.Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then Secretary-General of the UN, was nearing the end of his term when his desire to end the conflict in Somalia and achieve sustainable regional harmony was brought to the Security Council. The OAU, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Arab League agreed with this idea. This is because they had attempted to bargain with the various Somalian gatherings, but their efforts had failed (Philipp, 2005, pp.517–544).

In 1992, the Secretary General of the UN briefed the Security Council on the complexities of the war in Somalia, which led to the severe humanitarian crisis. The report stressed the importance of expediting humanitarian aid to the majority of Somalis facing hunger. Even while the UN was capable of accomplishing this, it was impeded by rampant assistance theft. As a result, security personnel were increased to secure relief and distribution locations throughout Somalia. This resulted in a 3000-soldier boost for United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) (Harned, 2016).

Following UNOSOM's involvement in the Somalia War, the US participated, indicating that the US' involvement in the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia, in particular, goes back at least to the Cold War. This period was when the Americans and the Soviets were struggling over territory with the goal of turning them into allies in return for protection. Somalia's military conflict had been wreaking havoc on the population, and universal suffering was indeed the norm as warlords and clans battled for all resources available and plundered one another. The torment was shown on various television networks in America and was depicted in periodicals. The US had just returned from victory in 'Operation Desert Storm,' so it believed it couldn't overlook the suffering in Somalia at the moment (Stewart, 2003).

As the hardship in Somalia intensified as a result of famine, the US launched relief methods such as

airlifting goods from neighboring countries such as Kenya into Somalia's interior, preventing convoys that might be easily seized by militias. 'Operation Provide Relief' was the name given to the airlift of aid into Somalia. It was named on August 15, 1992. Because of the US's logistical competence, assistance was quickly carried into Somalia and distributed by relief groups that were previously established and functioning under UNOSOM. Stewart (2003) noted that this benefited the US since it avoided having to send soldiers into crisis zones.

In 2003, President George W. Bush authorized the deployment of US troops in order to assist in alleviating famine and hunger in the war-torn country. Despite this, aid to the region continued to be looted by warlords and gunmen who used relief goods to purchase support from the local community rather than the people. International organizations were frightened and compelled to pay huge amounts of money for their safety, whereby if they did not, they risked being killed (Lotze and Williams 2016).

The US's main goal in Somalia was the establishment of democracy. The US believed that with the establishment of democracy, there would be peace and prosperity in Somalia. But let's not forget that Somalia was under dictatorship rule for a very long time where the president at the time ruled with fear and pure brutality, so moving from such a period to complete diplomacy was a fantasy and the Somali people did not need democracy at the time but just wanted peace and security.

The UN founded Unified Task Force (UNITAF) but did not participate in its structure or leadership. The force was formed after the Security Council's passage of Resolution 794, which declared that all means necessary would be employed to provide a humanitarian route and restore the rule of law in Somalia. 24,000 American troops and 17,000 coalition forces arrived in Mogadishu for the first time in December 1992 (Philipp, 2005, pp.517–544).

The fundamental purpose of UNITAF was to create security and a safe channel for relief to reach all people in need across Somalia. Furthermore, it tried to restore law and order. After fulfilling these objectives, UNITAF intended to give control over to UNOSOM. Furthermore, in a letter to then President Bush, the Secretary General of the UN said that a handover to UNOSOM could only take place if a certain criterion was met: that UNITAF's power to extend and implement throughout Mogadishu and its vicinity whereby they have legitimacy in Mogadishu and its environs. Some disagreements arose between UNITAF and the UN in order for these aims to be fulfilled. They couldn't agree on anything, notably how to disarm the militias.

UNITAF Lieutenant General Johnson declared on January 28th 1992 that most of the belligerent factions had been disarmed, that relief was flowing, that business was slowly returning, and that UNITAF's aims had been "achieved." This suggested that the time had come to give over responsibilities to UNOSOM II, particularly in the southern parts of Somalia. The US desired a speedy changeover, owing to the fact that the operation's expenditures were a significant burden-it was reported that it would cost the US $560 million in three months (Walter, 2005).

The Addis Ababa accord was regarded as a watershed moment in Somalia's journey toward peace and state building. If this deal had been successful, it would have saved the Somali people a lot of pain and suffering. If it had worked, the notion of global backing for multilateral peacekeeping would have gained traction. Every nation would have accepted the responsibility of regional and worldwide peace-building. Regrettably, the collapse of such an agreement had such a negative impact on the UN

because it was one of many reasons why the global community turned a blind eye to the 1994 Rwandan genocide prior to actually taking action to address it. The accord was aimed at creating a transnational government, laying the groundwork for elections in March 1995, and ending the UN peacekeeping mission in the country (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

The agreement resulted in three items. An immediate cease-fire throughout Somalia's cities; an agreement on how to carry out the truce; and an agreement on the mechanics of both the critical subject of disarmament.Unfortunately, the Addis Ababa Accord was also not fully implemented. In fact, weapons poured into the capital, Mogadishu, ensuring that the purpose of disarmament would fail. It was only a few months after the agreement was made. Furthermore, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was not established. General Mohamed Aidid, one of the principal warlords present at the deal, condemned the pact and said that he was compelled to sign it by the UN. The attack was known as 'Black Hawk Down,' which resulted in the evacuation of both the US and UN, hence resulting in the completion of the Addis Ababa Accord (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

International peacebuilding efforts in Somalia were successful to some extent, but one thing that they had in common is that they did not totally understand the root causes of the conflict. Another problem was that the international parties had their own different interests in the country. If the root causes of the conflict are not identified and solved accordingly, the conflict will persist, and that is the reality in Somalia. Since the fall of the Bare regime, Somalia has not had a stable government that controls and has jurisdiction over the entire country. This can be seen as a result of not solving the root causes of the conflict.

**REGIONAL PEACE BUILDING EFFORTS IN SOMALIA**

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is made up of eight African republics from the Horn of Africa. The main purpose of IGAD is to help member governments achieve economic growth via collective cooperation and partnerships in order to eradicate poverty, preserve the environment, and promote regional peace and security. Following the UN and the African Union's (AU) failure to achieve peace in Somalia, they officially entrusted Somalia's safety to IGAD (Sally & Bradbury, 2010).

The major obstacles that IGAD confronted in resolving the Somali conflict can be classified into two groups: economic and political. Economic problems are one of the challenges that IGAD member countries face. This is mostly due to the member nations' failure to pay the agreements, and as a result, they were reliant on the US, UN, EU, and AU for financing of the next meetings. Nonetheless, the member states' economic dependence managed to give international contributors an advantage in the discussion, which resulted in, instead of focusing on what was ideal for their region and the Somali people, alternatives were much more likely to be oriented toward the international donors' and global communities' interests (Byiers, 2016).

Disunity among IGAD member nations was the second and most significant challenge that IGAD faced. Because of the ongoing wars and conflicts between surrounding nations, the eastern parts of Africa are recognized as the most dangerous area in the world. As a result, while discussing the Somalia issue, they utilize the crisis to advance their own interests rather than Somalia's. The insecurity in the region has made resolving Somalia's problems extremely difficult (Byiers, 2016). The Horn of Africa Standing Committee on Somalia was formed in 1992, with Ethiopian Prime

Minister Meles Zenawi acting as the first chairperson. It had collapsed numerous times before, and after years of civil conflict in Somalia, the Ethiopian government established the 'Sodere National Reconciliation Conference'. This conference was given the name Sodere since it was held in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. The US wanted Ethiopia to play a critical role in resolving the Somali conflict in order to support its strategy of 'African solutions to African problems' (Apuuli, 2010).

After the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and the US in 1994, the humanitarian mission has been mostly disrupted by deadly clan warfare and multiple fatalities without any outcome. African countries were worried about the situation because they thought they needed to assist the Somali people. The neighboring countries of Somalia in the Horn of Africa shared this sentiment (Apuuli, 2010).

Sodere was a watershed moment in the history of Somali peace talks in a variety of ways. First, it sparked the first constructive debate among the prominent Somali political actors following the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Somalia. Second, it effectively brought all of the clan faction leaders together. Third, this was the first procedure that gave rise to the principles of delegation and inclusion. Sodere received backing from governments and groups both inside and outside the region, but it also failed for a number of reasons. To begin with, Hussein Aideed, the son of General Aideed who led the Somali National Alliance, did not participate in the Sodere conference. Despite the fact that twenty-six clans were represented, one of Somalia's most influential political actors declined to attend. Second, when it was founded, the NSC had only been active in Addis Abeba. As a result, many Somalis assumed that the NSC was a puppet of Ethiopia, when in reality, the people of Somalia blamed the government of Ethiopia for interfering in Somalia's affairs, causing instability, and prolonging the conflict. Ethiopia is accused of undermining two previous peace deals, the Arta Agreement and the Cairo Agreement of 2000 (Apuuli, 2010, pp. 261-282). Once the agreement at Sodere was reached, Egypt began to exercise influence in the political affairs of Somalia by opposing the peace efforts led by Ethiopia. In order to disregard and undermine the Sodere Conference, Egypt arranged another gathering of the warring Somali tribes in Cairo in 1997 (Apuuli, 2010).

Egypt's attempt to restore peace in Somalia ended in failure for a variety of reasons, including the perception that it was strengthening the Hawiye clan position while negatively impacting the representation and political ambitions of the Darod clan. Some of the main clan leaders, including Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and General Gebyo, decided to boycott the conference, accusing the Egyptian government of overturning the process of Sodere. Eventually, after the failure of both the Cairo Peace process and the Sodere Peace process, Djibouti initiated a new effort that would be more meaningful than the previous peacebuilding conferences (Menkhaus, 2007).

The 'Arta Peace Process' was the name given to this peace effort. Egypt and the UN were supporters of these discussions, although they simply offered fair mediation. Djibouti's peace process resulted in the TNG of August 2000. It included both civil society activists as well as clan chiefs. This process culminated in the 4.5 plan, which would be implemented in Somalia.The 4.5 plan required a certain set of representatives for each clan in Somalia's politics. The idea is that Somalia's four biggest clan-families, Darood, Dir, Digil, Hawiye, and Mirifle, should be given an adequate proportion of seats in parliament. The Bantu and the Benadir, who are the'minority clans,' including the lower caste groups, would get half of what the main clans did (Menkhaus, 2007).

The Arta peace agreement did not establish an administration that advocated for national unity. As a result, various groups and clans created opposition organizations, making it impossible for the TNG

to access certain parts of the country. The Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was an Ethiopian-led military group. Warlords headquartered in Mogadishu provided additional opposition to the TNG, leading to its decline (Menkhaus, 2007).

The Arta peace process is said to be one of the key peace methods used to incorporate Somali women into conflict settlement. This peace process indicated that real political participation and peace talks could take place outside of Somalia and have a significant impact. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an African peacekeeping mission that was established in 2007 under the supervision of the UN with a six-month mandate. This peacekeeping operation was acknowledged after the IGAD's peacekeeping operation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia (IGASOM), was replaced. IGASOM functioned in the region with UN assistance before December 2006. (Menkhaus et al., 2009).

AMISOM soldiers were stationed in the Somalia region in early 2007, replacing IGASOM and Ethiopian forces in Somalia. With the purpose of safeguarding regional peace and stability, it launched peace negotiations between warring groups and played a major role in Somalia's first democratic election. It carried out a number of military support projects, including the provision of healthcare services and water to the local community and the promotion of discourse and reconciliation (Linnea, 2017, pp. 161–173).

AMISOM has played a significant role in reclaiming regions previously controlled by Al-Shabaab terrorist organizations. Working in a nation with no laws or governance is difficult for some of them. The key obstacles include a general lack of funding, inadequate institutional frameworks, and a lack of discipline. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to attain the anticipated outcome.

Regional peacebuilding efforts were welcomed by many Somali citizens, but many political elites as well as Somali people argued that the participation of Ethiopia and Kenya in the peacebuilding efforts was not welcomed. They argued that Ethiopia and Kenya did not have good intentions towards Somalia since both countries had a bad history with Somalia, whereby a huge land mass that is believed to have belonged to Somalia was given to Kenya and Ethiopia during colonization. This has caused several clashes and hatred between Somalia and the two countries. Djibouti was the only country that all the Somali population trusted since they shared historical ties before the colonization period. Ethiopia and Kenya's skepticism is understandable given their hostile foreign policies toward Somalia. Various parties in Somalia used this aspect to deny and refuse any form of peacebuilding efforts that the two countries were part of, hence increasing tensions among different parties in the peacebuilding efforts.

**INTERNAL PEACE BUILDING EFFORTS IN SOMALIA**

With the exception of both international and regional attempts to establish peace and reconciliation, certain local institutions have also attempted to achieve this aim. Following the fall of the Siad Bare regime in 1991, two de facto republics emerged—Puntland and Somaliland. The two countries used clan leaders and the bottom-up method to implement their own internal peacebuilding strategies. It is worth noting that these two states do not receive adequate help and support from the international community (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, p. 3).

The Somaliland peacebuilding effort has a clear unique identity that is appreciated by all of its residents. Historical contexts have contributed to the spread of this common identity. Such common

identification may be dated directly to ethnic origins as well. The north (Somaliland) was neglected throughout the Siad Barre rule, which fostered a sense of common hardship. Another factor that contributed to this identity was the civil war that lasted from 1988 to 1991 (Ridout, 2012, pp.136-156).

Somaliland has chosen a combination of a traditional system and representative democracy over a wholly Westernized democratic form of governance or institutions. In this hybrid system, there is a president, a vice president, and cabinet ministers who form the executive, while the bicameral legislature includes an upper chamber of elders and lawmakers. As a result, the Somaliland administration is seen as a power-sharing coalition made up of all clans inside the country. This effectively brought together all clan families in the government, and minorities are now involved in this type of governance, hence fundamentally promoting peace and unity (Walls, 2009, pp.308-310). The Somali National Movement (SNM), which was fighting for the freedom of Somaliland throughout the civil war, profited from local ownership since they had extensive grassroots support. Prior to the formation of the coalition administration, small local conflicts were addressed in response to communities taking ownership of the peacebuilding effort. Unlike in Greater Somalia, when parties rapidly called for conferences while disregarding the underlying complaints, most experts believe that the process must achieve its aim again (Ridout, 2012, pp.136-156).

When it comes to Puntland, it's worth noting that it's comparable to Somaliland, whereby relative peace and structures have worked hard to deliver resources and a government with a clear separation of powers. Puntland was proposing a federal Somalia in which it will be regarded as a federal member of Somalia when compared to Somaliland. Puntland was eventually recognized as a Somali federal state in 1998. The fear of the status of clans such as Majerten and its kin from the Harti clan line, in this case, Warsangelis and Dhulbahante, according to history, was a main reason for the establishment of Puntland (Johnson & Smaker, 2014 Pp. 3)

Puntland's peacebuilding process may be examined from three perspectives. These are the actors participating; the effectiveness of mediation and administration; and local ownership combined with money and credibility. Once again, the 'Isimo' plays a significant part in resolving the conflict between the Puntland chiefs. Their handling of the entire procedure instilled trust in the local community (Johnson & Smaker, 2014, Pp.3-23).

Finally, community ownership, along with money and legitimacy, is important for the Puntland state. The settlements in Somalia's northeast are considered secluded and unreachable. In Somali, it is known as 'gariwaa.' Solitude and lack of access, as well as historical marginalization by various Somali administrations, prompted Puntland residents to develop a shared identity. Hostility from clans in the south and northwest enhanced this unified identity. Additionally, the northwest villages take pride in their 'political maturity,' which results in a sense of collectivism to encourage and accelerate their peacebuilding efforts.

**THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN SOMALIA**

The role of the media in every peacebuilding effort is significant. The media creates the political atmosphere whereby the peace negotiations happen, has an impact on the state of the peace efforts debate, and can encourage or neglect the authenticity of the relevant stakeholders in a peace negotiation. Due to a lack of substantial and well-organized media infrastructure, the role of the media in peacebuilding in Somalia is essentially unseen (Sanjanah.WordPress, 2007).

Since the overthrow of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991, Somalia has had insufficient or negligible media. HornAfrik, for example, was founded in 1999 by Somalis coming back from Canada. Originally,

it started as a radio station and expanded to provide a TV network and a website. Because of the popularity and efficacy of this medium, kin/clan-based radio stations have become obsolete and have closed (Skjerdal, 2011).

Additionally, HornAfrik has collaborated on peacebuilding efforts with Somali-based Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) along with small local radio broadcasters. One of the main local radio stations was Radio Shabelle. When two of its founders and two other journalists were assassinated, it was hailed as a defender of press freedom and peace. This occurred between 2007 and 2009, when HornAfrik was in the forefront of publicizing human rights violations, resulting in pressure from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Somali militias. It has also given NGOs unrestricted airtime to communicate their messages to the whole Somali population. The NGOs conveyed information about health and peace to the wider populace. HornAfrik has been described as one of Somalia's most recognized media organizations, with a large international network. It has gained the support of industry titans like the BBC, which would also have used it to retransmit Somali broadcasts on its native frequency. Most notably, the network has been recognized for encouraging dialogue between several opposing parties (Skjerdal, 2011, pp. 40–42).

## THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN SOMALIA

In the Somali community, women often have limited or minor duties. When the civil war broke out, women realized that a disaster had befallen society and that they had a part in bringing about reconciliation. One name that stands out is Mariam Hussein Awreeyea, the wife of a well-known Somali human rights activist. Dr. Hawa Abdi was another prominent figure. She was a gynecologist educated in Russia, and she was also nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. In the city of Merka, all three were running orphanages and education centers focused on encouraging peace in Southern Somalia. They put their lives on the line in one of the conflict's most dangerous cities (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013, p.314-333).

Women were helping to promote peace in Somalia's northwest, notably in Somaliland. Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) was one of the first NGOs to emerge in the middle of the civil war. The 'Women Development Organization' was created in the 1990s in Merka, in the south-west, with one of its major aims being militia disarmament. Somliland's businesswomen from the 'Hargesia Business Community' released an appeal to publications pleading with both warring groups not to jeopardize Somliland's stability (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013 Pp.314-333).

The Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organization (CGWO) was a notable NGO in Mogadishu in 1996. It served as a shield for women's voices aimed at promoting peace. NAGAAD was another NGO created by women in Somaliland that aspired to build peace. In general, these were some of the first women to be involved in the peace building effort. Women have proactively entered politics since the founding of the TFG in order to begin peacebuilding efforts (Ingiriis & Hoehne, 2013).

## SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

It is critical to explain briefly why international and regional attempts to achieve peace in Somalia have had almost no effect. Academics have proposed the following explanations: Domestic'spoilers' and constraints emanating from various warlords, foreign'spoilers' and impediments wherein certain exterior mediators seemed to have an interest in Somalia, hence sought the war to continue. Ethiopia is regarded as being one of these actors. Most researchers, however, see this as a conspiracy theory. One of the factors that is frequently identified is missed opportunities, whereby international mediators lacked political interests and failed to address crucial issues during mediation.

Consider the UN, which has been chastised for its inattention, lack of political interest, and failure to seize critical opportunities for resolving the Somali conflict.Lastly, there is the problem of misinterpretation, in which international and regional mediation attempts failed to take the approach of first assessing the Somali situation and then prescribing a solution. This contributed to the use of ineffective mediation strategies as well as poor representation of the warring factions in various conferences. International mediators were frequently uninformed of the realities of clannism, which resulted in their incapacity to succeed.

One thing that almost all mediators from international and regional peacebuilding efforts had in common was that they did not understand the root causes of the Somali conflict. Various solutions that were introduced were not solutions that Somalia needed at the time, which resulted in failure. For the establishment of peace and security that lasts for a very long time, the root causes of the insecurity should be identified and solved accordingly.

Internal initiatives have resulted in a sense of stability in regions where peacebuilding efforts have been used. In Somaliland and Puntland, for example, Since their establishment, Somalia's two de facto republics have enjoyed stability and functional institutions. Researchers and Somalis alike believe that domestic attempts have been more successful since 'a domestic problem is best addressed by a domestic solution'. Both international and regional efforts at peacebuilding are seen to have had no huge impact on the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia because of the private interests of both international and regional actors.

**CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this paper was to examine the causes of the Somali war as well as the techniques used by different peacemakers to address insecurity and achieve long-term peace in Somalia. Although being one of the world's most homogenous communities in terms of culture, religion, ethnicity, and language, Somalis have fallen into a terrible cycle of continuous warfare over dominance, territory, and resources. The 1991 ouster of President Siad Barre's administration aggravated the situation. Ever since, Somalia has been embroiled in a civil conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The violence in Somalia affected not just the Somali population but the entire world.

This was attributable to the fact that, following the state collapse, Somalia was becoming a refuge for terrorism and piracy, which frightened the region and the rest of the globe. While warfare was a part of prehistoric peoples' lives, this paper argues that the primary reasons for the Somali conflict were the colonial legacy, the Cold War legacy, governmental persecution, and competition for power and resources. It is common knowledge that the biggest African conflicts originated as a result of European-created arbitrary boundaries. Somalia, being a part of the continent that is also geographically located in a geostrategic zone, was not spared from this separation.

Somalia's ongoing antagonism and violent confrontations with its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, are fueled by its colonial heritage. Former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, used to see Somalia as a friend, but the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) soon replaced them. This colonial heritage encouraged Pan-Somalism among Somalis, inspiring policies pursued by various post-colonial Somali administrations.

On October 21, 1969, after a brief period of relative democracy, General Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless military coup. A failed military coup attempt by high-ranking military officials from the Majeerteen Clan in 1978 marked the pinnacle of his authoritarian tactics. President Said Barre implemented a divide-and-rule political paradigm that turned tribes against one another in a zero-sum political game. Attempts to remove him centered in the 1980s on clan-based armies, which

turned on each other immediately after their shared opponent, Said Barre, was overthrown.

In the first decade, a peacebuilding initiative that began immediately after the conflict began in 1991 failed to yield any positive outcomes. Approximately fifteen peace conferences have been organized by diverse parties, including regional and international organizations. Several significant conferences, including the Djibouti Conference in 1991, the Addis Ababa Conference in 1993, and the Cairo Conference in 1997, were backed by regional states and the international community.

The Arta Peace Process was a watershed point in Somalia's peace process. The warlords from various conflicting factions were excused for the first time. The Somali people across the globe, as well as the international community, continued to put a lot of pressure on the conference delegates. The system established the 4.5 Formula, which is still in use in Somali politics today.

The underappreciated local peacebuilding process demonstrated that peacebuilding efforts did not have to be restricted to external, regional, and international mediation. The various peacebuilding procedures carried out in Somalia's North and Northeast regions demonstrated that the Somali people in these areas had a say and had made significant efforts to achieve long-term peace.

The purpose of this article is also to provide a number of recommendations. To begin, Somalia's security must be restored, particularly in the central and southern areas, if significant measures are to be taken. The global community should assist the Somali Federal Government in securing these regions while also strengthening state-building efforts. It will be critical not only for resolving the Somalia conflict, but also for promoting regional peace in the Horn of Africa and dealing with transnational threats emanating from Somalia.

The second recommendation is that it is important to construct a functional country that will strengthen the social fabric of Somalia in order to put the country back on track for recovery and reconciliation. This should entail re-establishing the rule of law, also re-establishing functional institutions, laying the groundwork for socioeconomic recovery, providing basic services, and promoting human rights; establishing some sort of justice; and reconciliation efforts among various communities. Furthermore, similar activities must also be launched, particularly in regions that are developing stability as a result of the increase in peacekeeping operations by the African mission in Somalia. Such efforts will be directed at the recapture of these territories while maintaining the political, developmental, and rule of law advances made in the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland.

The third recommendation is that the international community should promote the stabilization and development of Somalia to better the Somali people by providing scholarships to students and also offering educational classes to spread awareness of how all Somali people should come together to build the country and to bring forward the positive nationalism that the country needs today. This also needs the international community to give space and time for the elected officials of Somalia to come up with domestic solutions for domestic problems. This can only be possible if the elected Somali officials never put the interests of foreign entities before the interests of the common citizens of Somalia.

Last but not least, the last recommendation is that in order to avoid or limit the dangers of any true peacebuilding process, the Somali people should initiate a genuinely indigenous and locally owned peacebuilding process. The idea, money, and facilitation should all come from within the country.

The approach should be limited to national reconciliation and unification and not deflected to state building. A multidimensional and comprehensive, inclusive approach is necessary to address the critical challenges that Somalia faces as a country, such as secessionism, terrorism, state building, and economic growth. The limited emphasis on counter-terrorism taken by the UN and the US and the counter-extreme nationalism espoused by neighboring nations such as Kenya and Ethiopia are considered provocative and ultimately unhelpful by many Somalis. The peace initiatives utilized by Somaliland and Puntland, a bottom-up peacebuilding method that does not exclude any credible person or institution, and also the promotion of local solutions for local issues, would be critical for resolving the Somali peacebuilding challenge.

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**
**AMISOM:** African Union Mission in Somalia
**AU:** African Union
**CGWO:** Coalition for Government Women Organization
**EU:** European Union
**FGS:** Federal government of Somalia
**IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development
**IGASOM:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia
**NGOs:** Non-Governmental Organizations
**OAU:** Organization of African Unity
**SNM:** Somali National Movement
**SRRC:** Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
**SSWC:** Save Somalia Women and Children
**TNG:** The Transitional National Government
**UN:** United Nations
**UNOSOM:** United Nations Operations in Somalia
**UNITAF:** Unified Task Force
**US:** United States
**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

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